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INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS
AND ARBITRATION
CLYDE W. SUMMERS
OLLECTIVE bargaining is a system of industrial government in
which governing power is shared by two collective entities-union
and management. The collective agreement, in the words of the Su-
preme Court, "calls into being a new common law"' which the
parties agree shall be the law of the plant during the term of the
agreement. Its explicit provisions and implied terms provide a frame-
work of rules which guide and control the parties in developing their
industrial common law through the grievance and arbitration process.
This system of industrial government, although essentially pri-
vate, is not wholly autonomous. Its very existence is encouraged and
protected by the labor relations acts which define the status of the
collective parties, prescribe the area of shared control, and compel
adherence to private lawmaking procedures. The statutory structure
focuses predominantly on the relation of the collective entities to
each other, leaving them largely free to establish by agreement the
body of rules governing terms and conditions of employment. The
freedom to agree, however, is not absolute, for there is a competing
concern for the rights of individual employees who are governed by
the collective agreement. Union and management cannot, for example,
establish rules which create invidious or arbitrary distinctions, 2 nor
agree that the law of the plant shall be applied to achieve that endY
Regardless of their mutual interests, under Taft-Hartley they cannot
agree that only union members shall be hired,4 or that employment
shall be conditioned on obedience to union rules., Indeed, the col-
lective parties cannot even agree to establish a system of industrial
government without first obtaining the approval of a majority of the
employees. Thus the freedom of collective agreement is limited by
individual rights. Drawing the boundaries so as to accommodate these
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1. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 579 (1960).
2. Syres v. Oil Workers, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) (mere.); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R,
323 U.S. 192 (1944).
3. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
4. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (3), as amended, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (Supp. II, 1959-1960); § 8(b)(2), added by 61 Stat.
141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1958) [hereinafter cited as NLRA].
5. Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
6. International Ladies' Garment Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
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competing values poses some of the most difficult problems within
the statutory structure.7
This problem of accommodating collective interests and individual
rights extends beyond the making of the collective agreement to its
administration. In the five years since Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Mills, the federal courts have been engaged in fashioning a body of
substantive law for the interpretation and enforcement of collective
agreements. Their attention has thus far been focused exclusively on
the rights and duties of the collective parties to each other, and the
Supreme Court has explicitly deferred consideration of the status of
the individual employee under the collective agreement and his rights
with relation to the collective parties.f The Court has not even crossed
the threshold of declaring that these rights are governed by federal
substantive law.
If the radiations of section 301 ultimately reach individual rights
under the collective agreement-and for reasons given later, this
seems inevitable-the task of working out an accommodation of col-
lective interests and individual rights may challenge the judicial in-
ventiveness relied on in Lincoln Mills. The purpose of this article is
to try to state more explicitly the fundamental but narrow problem
involved, to search out statutory guides which point the courts toward
solutions appropriate for our system of industrial government, and
to suggest some of the detailed rules through which the needs of the
collective parties and the needs of the individual employee can be
accommodated. 10
I
A PREVIEW OF THE PROBLEM
State courts have been confronted with the problem of the rights
of individuals under the collective agreement in a substantial number
of cases, but no settled body of law has developed." The various
7. See, e.g., NLRB v. News Syndicate Co., 365 U.S. 695 (1961); Local 3S7, Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
8. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
9. Id. at 459 n.9..
10. This paper seeks to develop more completely the analysis suggested in Summers,
Individual Rights in Collective Agreements: A Preliminary Analysis, 9 Buffalo L. Rev.
239 (1960). Further consideration has led the author to different conclusions as to certain
details but no change in the basic analysis.
11. The state cases have been collected and analyzed from arious points of viewin a number of studies. See Comm. on Improvement of Administration of Union-Em-
ployer Contracts, Report, in ABA Section of Labor Relations Law, Proceedings 33 (1954),
reprinted, 50 Nw. U.L. Rev. 143 (1955) [hereinafter cited as ABA Report on Individual
Grievances]; Blumrosen, Legal Protection for Critical Job Interests: Union-Management
Authority Versus Employee Autonomy, 13 Rutgers L. Rev. 631 (1959); Cox, Rights
Under a Labor Agreement, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601 (1956); H~anslowe, Individual Rights
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forms which the problem may take and the range of reactions of
state courts is illustrated by two lines of similar cases in New York"
and Wisconsin.
In Parker v. Borock,13 an employee was discharged on the
grounds that he had engaged in conduct detrimental to the employer.
He filed a grievance, and the union refused to carry the case to
arbitration after discussions with management had proved fruitless.
Parker himself then moved to compel the employer to arbitrate, but
this motion was denied on the grounds that enforcement of the
arbitration clause was "purely a Union right."' 4 Thus blocked by the
union and the employer from using the contractual procedures, Parker
sued the employer for damages for discharge in violation of the col-
lective agreement. The employer sought to frustrate this suit by
moving to stay pending arbitration, but the lower court refused to
leave the plaintiff remediless and ruled that since there was no dispute
between the union and the employer there was nothing to arbitrate."
In the New York Court of Appeals, however, the plaintiff reached a
dead end. The court held that although the individual employee was
a direct beneficiary of the provision prohibiting discharge without just
cause, his right could be enforced only through the arbitration pro-
cedure which the collective agreement made accessible only to the
union. The status of the individual was made painfully clear. "A
reading of the existing agreement indicates that plaintiff has entrusted
his rights to his union representative. It may be that the union failed
to preserve them ... '[T]he only conclusion which logically follows
is that the employee is without any remedy, except as against his
own union .... 2 ,1 A concurring judge reinforced the contract logic
in Collective Labor Relations, 45 Cornell L.Q. 25 (1959); Howlett, Contract Rights of
the Individual Employee as Against the Employer, 8 Lab. L.J. 316 (1957); Summers,
supra note 10.
12. For the New York cases and their development see Note, Union Arbitration,
the Civil Practice Act and the Remedy of the Individual, 35 St. John's L. Rev. 85
(1960). See also Hanslowe, supra note 11.
13. 5 N.Y.2d 156, 156 N.E.2d 297, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1959).
14. United States v. Voges, 124 F. Supp. 543, 546 (E.D.N.Y. 1954).
15. 136 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct. 1954), aff'd mem., 286 App. Div. 851, 141 N.Y.S.2d
359 (2d Dep't 1955). The appeal was dismissed by the court of appeals. 4 N.Y.2d 731,
148 N.E.2d 324, 171 N.Y.S.2d 118 (1958) (mem.). The employer then moved for sum-
mary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff was not a party to the collective agree-
ment and obtained no rights under it. The appellate division rejected this argument but
found that the contract was for employment at will and that therefore, there was no
violation. 1 App. Div. 2d 969, 150 N.Y.S.2d 396 (2d Dep't 1956) (mem.). In this pos-
ture the case was returned to the court of appeals.
16. 5 N.Y.2d at 161, 156 N.E.2d at 300, 182 N.Y.S.2d at 581, quoting Donato v.
American Locomotive Co., 283 App. Div. 410, 417, 127 N.Y.S.2d 709, 716 (3d Dep't),
aff'd mem., 306 N.Y. 966, 120 N.E.2d 227 (1954).
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with "policy considerations" which led him to conclude that "absent
specific language giving the employee the right to act on his own
behalf ... the union alone has a right to control the prosecution of
discharge cases." Like the majority, he observed that "the employee
has a remedy against the union for breach of fiduciary duty if it un-
fairly discriminated against him. 17
The contract logic that the individual's rights under the col-
lective agreement were limited by provisions giving the union the
exclusive right to arbitration was carried another step in Matter of
Soto.' 8 Employees represented by the National Jewelry Workers and
earning $42 a week became dissatisfied, joined a rival union, and
engaged in a wildcat strike. This strike was enjoined and the em-
ployees returned to work, but the employer charged that seven of
the employees continued the disruption by engaging in a slowdown.
The employer notified the union of its intent to discharge, and the
union requested arbitration. The seven employees, notified of the
arbitration hearing, appeared with their own attorney who asked
leave to represent them. He pointed out that the lawyer representing
the Jewelry Workers at the arbitration had appeared as counsel for
the employer in enjoining the wildcat strike and also in proceedings to
hold officers of the rival union in contempt because of the alleged
slowdown. The arbitrator, after an adjournment, ruled that because
the Jewelry Workers Union was the sole bargaining agent under the
collective agreement, the employees had no right to be represented
by independent counsel. At the hearing the employer put in his case,
the union interposed no defense, and the arbitrator declared himself
impelled on the record to uphold the discharges. The employee's
motion to vacate the award was granted by the lower courts which
concluded that the practical reasons for permitting the union to con-
trol the presentation and prosecution of grievances did not require
that individuals directly affected by an arbitration be barred from
intervening when the lack of fair representation of their interests in
that proceeding is shown."9 The court of appeals, however, declared
that "this was a wrong approach. °20 Under the arbitration statute,
the award could be vacated only by a "party" to the arbitration.
Here, as in Parker v. Borock, the collective agreement granted the
right to arbitrate only to the union and the company. The individual
employee, therefore, was not a "party" to the arbitration procedure
and could neither intervene nor challenge the award. He was not
17. 5 N.Y2d at 162, 156 N.E.2d at 300, 182 N.Y.S.2d at 582.
18. 7 N.Y.2d 397, 165 N.E2d 855, 198 N.Y.S.2d 282 (1960).
19. 7 App. Div. 2d 1, 180 N.YS.2d 388 (lst Dep't 1958).
20. 7 N.Y.2d at 399, 165 N.E.2d at 856, 198 N.Y.S.2d at 253.
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foreclosed, however, "from pursuing any remedy at law which might
be available for breach of fiduciary duty owing by the union."2 1
The final turn of the screw in New York is presaged by Saint v.
Pope,22 in which three employees sued the union for violating its
fiduciary obligation by refusing to process their grievances for wrong-
ful layoff. This remedy, held out by the court of appeals in Matter of
Soto, proved illusory. The union as an unincorporated association could
be held liable, said the appellate division, "only if the cause of action
is provable against each and every member of the association."2' 3 Even
though the refusal to process the grievances was voted at a member-
ship meeting, not all members were present and the complaint had
to be dismissed.24
Similar cases in Wisconsin form a strikingly different pattern of
individual rights. In Pattenge v. Wagner Iron Works, 25 a group of
employees who were dissatisfied with their AFL representative joined
the CIO. When four of their members were discharged, the rest
walked out in protest. The AFL agreed with the employer that their
employment should be treated as terminated and that when they
returned to work they should be treated as new employees without
seniority. Later, when these employees were denied vacation pay for
which they had become eligible prior to the strike, they sued the
employer. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the provision for
vacation pay, which was "clearly for the benefit of the individual em-
ployee," was imported into his individual employment contract on
which he could sue. Even though the collective agreement expressly
provided that the grievance and arbitration procedure "shall be the
sole means of disposing of grievances," the individual's contract
right was not conditioned on resort to a hostile or unavailable pro-
cedure, for this would place his rights "at the mercy of an unfriendly
union.""
21. Id. at 400, 165 N.E.2d at 856, 198 N.Y.S.2d at 284.
22. 12 App. Div. 2d 168, 211 N.Y.S.2d 9 (4th Dep't 1961). Their suit against the
employer had already been dismissed on the authority of Parker v. Borock. See Saint v.
Bell Aircraft Corp., 12 App. Div. 2d 871, 210 N.Y.S.2d 999 (4th Dep't 1961) (me.).
For a similar case see Prin v. Deluca, 48 L.R.R.M. 2919 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961).
23. 12 App. Div. 2d 168, 171, 211 N.Y.S.2d 9, 11 (4th Dep't 1961). The court
distinguished the case of Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y.2d 283, 151 N.E.2d 73, 174 N.Y.S.2d
633 (1958), which held that a member wrongfully expelled from the union and thereby
prevented from obtaining work could sue the union in damages without showing
acquiescence of all members.
24. As a secondary ground for dismissal, the court relied on the failure of the
plaintiffs to exhaust their appeals within the union before beginning suit. 12 App. Div.
2d at 175, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
25. 275 Wis. 495, 82 N.W.2d 172 (1957).
26. Id. at 500, 82 N.W.2d at 174.
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The contrast between the New York and Wisconsin judicial
reactions is further sharpened by Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp.,-
which involved a dispute over the senority rights of employees who
had been promoted to supervisory positions and later returned to
the bargaining unit. The employer credited the former supervisors
with continuous seniority from the date of hiring, but the union con-
tended that the time spent as supervisor should be deducted. The
union filed a grievance on behalf of the other employees and proc-
essed it to arbitration. However, none of the former supervisors were
notified of the hearing and none were present or participated. When
the arbitrator ruled in favor of the union and the employer proceeded
to comply, they moved to vacate the award. The court held that since
the union's position in the arbitration was adverse to these employees,
it could not fairly represent them, and they were therefore entitled
to notice so that they could intervene and obtain representation of
their interests. Although their seniority rights were created solely by
the collective agreement negotiated by the union in their behalf,
those valuable rights could not be divested without due process of
law. This required representation in the proceedings by one whose
interests were substantially the same. To the argument that the
former supervisors' interests were adequately represented by the em-
ployer, the court answered that as a matter of sound labor policy,
employees "should never be put in the position of having to solely
depend upon the employer's championing their rights under the col-
lective-bargaining contract."2 On a motion for rehearing, the union
argued that the court had interfered with its right as exclusive rep-
resentative under the NLRA, and that because it could have nego-
tiated a contract denying the supervisors seniority, it could accomplish
the same thing through arbitration. The court branded this argument
as "fallacious," and declared: "Once the rights of employees have 0
become fixed in the collective-bargaining contract, the union does not
possess the right to barter them away before an arbitrator."-"
27. 8 Wis. 2d 264, 99 N.W.2d 132 (1959), rehearing denied, 8 Wis. 2d 277, 100
N.W.2d 317 (1960).
28. 8 Wis. 2d at 275, 99 N.W.2d at 138.
29. 8 Wis. 2d 277, 277a, 100 N.W.2d 317, 318 (1960). The contrast between New
York and Wisconsin is completed by Fray v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 9 Wis. 2d 631,
101 N.W.2d 782 (1960), 13 Stan. L. Rev. 123. The plaintiff claimed that he was wrong-
fully discharged. Although he gave immediate notice of his discharge to the union, the
officers failed to file a formal grievance within the time limits fixed by the contracL He
sued the union for the negligence of the officers in causing him to lose his reinstatement
rights. The union moved to dismiss on the ground that because the union had no legal
existence apart from its members, the plaintiff was in effect suing himself and other
co-principals for the negligence of their common agent. Although earlier Wisconsin cases
had followed this reasoning and other courts had used it to bar a union member from
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These two lines of cases serve to reveal certain basic elements
of the problem of defining individual rights under a collective agree-
ment. First, the cases suggest the wide range of reaction and con-
flicting results reached by state courts when confronted with this
problem. Neither the New York nor Wisconsin decisions are sports
in the law, but rather they represent the main streams of the two
opposing currents running through the state court decisions. For
example, a Michigan case followed reasoning parallel to that in Parker
v. Borock to hold that the individual's rights were enforceable only
through the union's grievance procedure,o while Alabama 1 and Dis-
trict of Columbia32 cases adopted the logic of Pattenge v. Wagner
Iron Works to permit the individual to sue. A Pennsylvania case held,
like Matter of Soto, that a discharged employee was not entitled to
independent counsel at the arbitration, even though there were strong
reasons to believe his discharge was instigated by the union;33 but
cases in California34 and Kentucky 5 follow the basic rationale of
Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp. In many states, such as Maryland, the
decisions seem to look both ways.3 The federal courts, in applying
state law, have understandably not lessened the confusion." Whether
or not the law is in a "state of flux,"" it is in a state of basic con-
flict.39 Neither doctrinal analysis nor policy considerations have pro-
duced a dominant rule, much less a consensus.
suing his union for mishandling his grievance, the court rejected the argument. It held
that for this purpose the union was to be treated as a separate entity and that it could
be sued by a member for breach of its fiduciary obligation.
30. Cortez v. Ford Motor Co., 349 Mich. 108, 84 N.W.2d 523 (1957).
31. Alabama Power Co. v. Haygood, 266 Ala. 194, 95 So. 2d 98 (1957).
32. Marranzano v. Riggs Natl Bank, 184 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
33. Bailer v. Local 470, Intl Teamsters, 400 Pa. 188, 161 A.2d 343 (1960).
34. Guzzo v. United Steelworkers, 47 L.R.R.M. 2379 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1960), cert.
denied sub nor. Smith v. Superior Court, 365 U.S. 802 (1961).
35. Moore v. Local 89, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 49 L.R.R.M. 2677 (Ky. 1962).
36. Compare Jenkins v. Win. Schluderberg-T. J. Kurdle Co., 217 Md. 556, 144 A.2d
88 (1958), and Stremich v. A. S. Abell Co., 43 L.R.R.M. 2139 (Baltimore People's Ct.
1958), with Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Raynor, 220 Md. 501, 154 A.2d 814 (1959), and
Taschenberger v. Celanese Corp., 34 L.R.R.M. 2305 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1954).
37. See, e.g., Union News Co. v. Hildreth, 295 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961); Woodward
Iron Co. v. Ware, 261 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Kosley v. Goldblatt Bros., 251 F.2d 558
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 904 (1958); Guszkowski v. U.S. Trucking Corp., 162
F. Supp. 847 (D.N.J. 1958); Nichols v. National Tube Co., 122 F. Supp. 726 (N.D.
Ohio 1954), rev'd on other grounds sub noma. United States Steel Corp. v. Nichols, 229
F.2d 396 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 950 (1956); In re Norwalk Tire & Rubber
Co., 100 F. Supp. 706 (D. Conn. 1951). See also Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers, 171
F. Supp. 782 (D. Md. 1959), aff'd, 273 F.2d 614 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 849
(1960).
38. Donato v. American Locomotive Co., 283 App. Div. 410, 415, 127 N.Y.S.2d 709,
714 (3d Dep't 1954).
39. For example, the question whether the individual must exhaust his remedies
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Second, these cases help make it clearer that the center of the
problem and the source of the conflicting decisions is the status of
the union as bargaining agent with reference to employees governed
by the collective agreement. More specifically, to what extent does
the union have exclusive control over enforcement of provisions of
the agreement which are for the direct benefit of the employees? This
might, in the first instance, be a question of contract interpretation
-- did the union and the employer intend that rights created by the
agreement should be conditioned upon resort to union-controlled pro-
cedures?4 ° The roots of the conflicting decisions, however, go much
deeper, for interpretation of the collective agreement is but the first
step. Beyond the question whether management agreed to make the
individual's rights subject to the union's decision to enforce, is the
more basic question whether union and management can agree to
so subject the individual employee to the union's control. In Pattcngc
v. Wagner Iron Works41 the court declared that a contract clause
which placed an employee's rights "at the mercy of an unfriendly
union" would violate policies implicit in Section 9(a) of the NTLRA
and a parallel provision in the Wisconsin statute. In Clark v. Hein-
under the grievance procedure has covered a spectrum of answers. No resort need be
made if the suit is only for damages. Woodward Iron Co. v. Stingfellow, 271 Ala. 596,
126 So. 2d 96 (1960). Contra, Cone v. Union Oil Co., 129 Cal. App. 2d 558, 277 P.2d
464 (1954). Resort to the grievance procedure may not be required where the facts
suggest that it would be futile, Nichols v. National Tube Co., 122 F. Supp. 726, 728
(N J. Ohio 1954), -rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States Steel Corp. v. Nichols,
229 F.2d 396 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 950 (1956), but direct proof of attempt
and rebuff may be required, Guszkowski v. U.S. Trucking Co., 162 F. Supp. 847 (D.N.J.
1958). Exhaustion may be excused where only the union is empowered to invoke the
grievance procedure and fails to do so, Alabama Power Co. v. Haygood, 266 Ala. 194,
95 So. 2d 98 (1957); or it may be required even though the union refuses to appeal or
allow the individual to appeal, Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW, 400 Pa. 145, 161 A2d 882
(1960).
40. The grievance and arbitration clauses normally refer only to the collective parties.
Either union or management may appeal to the next step or demand arbitration. The
two together select the arbitrator and share the expenses. From this the courts usually
infer that the contract does not give the individual a right to arbitration, or make him
a party to the arbitration; and, following the logic of the New York decisions, that
this wording of the grievance and arbitration clause shows an intent that the individual's
right shall be conditioned on the union's decision to process his grievance through
arbitration. Other courts, in interpreting other contracts, have found no intent to make
the grievance procedure the sole method of enforcing individual rights. Kosley v. Gold-
blatt Bros., 251 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1958); In re Norwalk Tire & Rubber Co., 10 F.
Supp. 706 (D. Conn. 1951); Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Raynor, 220 Md. 501, 154 A.2d
814 (1959); Hudak v. Hornell Indus., Inc., 304 N.Y. 207, 106 N.E.2d 609 (1952). Still
others have found in the words of the arbitration clause an intent to permit the in-
dividual to compel arbitration on his own behalf. Gilden v. Singer Mfg. Co., 145 Conn.
117, 139 A.2d 611 (1958); Fagliarone v. Consolidated Film Indus., Inc., 20 NJ. MiLm.
193, 26 A.2d 425 (Cir. Ct. 1942).
41. 275 Wis. 495, 82 N.W.2d 172 (1957).
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Werner Corp.42 the court held that application of a contract clause
excluding the affected employees from the arbitration denied their
statutory rights of fair representation, if not their constitutional
right to due process. The issue is thus sharply drawn, for the New
York cases assert that union and management can, by agreement,
make the union exclusive representative of the employees for en-
forcing their rights under the collective agreement.
Third, these cases emphasize that although the central issue
strikes deeply, it is also narrowly confined. The question is not the
union's status as exclusive representative in making the collective
agreement, nor the union's freedom in negotiating the substantive
terms of the collective agreement to make them binding on all em-
ployees in the unit. On the contrary, the individual insists that his
terms and conditions shall be governed by the substantive provisions
of the agreement. He does not appeal for a variance from those
provisions, but rather demands compliance with them. Parker did not
seek an exemption from the "just cause" provision of the contract;
instead, he sought a determination that the employer had violated
that clause. And in Pattenge, the plaintiffs sought no individual
bargain but only enforcement of the vacation-pay benefits bargained
for by the union. The narrow question is whether the union has the
power to grant the employer variances or to sanction violations of
provisions which directly benefit the individual. Even within this
narrow scope, the individual does not seek to supplant the union, for
he does not claim that his interpretation of ambiguous clauses or
his version of uncertain facts shall control. Nor does he ask that
the union's views shall be precluded. As both Matter of Soto 43 and
Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp.44 make clear, all the individual seeks is
access to some neutral tribunal where, along with union and manage-
ment, he shall have an opportunity to be heard.
II
THE CONTROLLING LAW-FDERAL OR STATE?
In deciding these cases, state courts have applied state substan-
tive law, as have the federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction.
With rare exceptions, federal law or federal policy has not even been
mentioned, and in no case has it been considered controlling.45 When
42. 8 Wis. 2d 264, 99 NAV.2d 132 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 962 (1960).
43. 7 N.Y.2d 397, 165 N.E.2d 855, 198 N.Y.S.2d 282 (1960).
44. 8 Wis. 2d 264, 99 NAV.2d 132 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 962 (1960).
45. Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers, 171 F. Supp. 782 (D. Md. 1959), aff'd,
273 F.2d 614 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 849 (1960); Arsenault v. General Elec.
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state law governed the enforcement of collective agreements generally,
this was appropriate, but Section 301 of the LIMIRA has worked
sweeping changes. The question here is whether the impact of those
changes now requires that the rights of individual employees be
governed by federal substantive laws.
In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills," the Supreme Court held
that section 301 "authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of
federal law for the enforcement of . ..collective bargaining agree-
ments." 47 It is now clear that the federal law so fashioned supplants
state law. Although the state courts have concurrent jurisdiction,
they are not "free to apply individualized local rules, 4 for the
"substantive principles of federal labor law must be paramount in
the area covered by the statute." 4 The radiations of Lincoln Mills,
particularly as illuminated by later cases, would seem reasonably to
reach all relationships created by the collective agreement and all
proceedings to enforce its terms. The federal substantive law to be
fashioned would sensibly encompass the rights of the individual em-
ployee under the collective agreement and his suit to enforce those
rights? °
Doubts whether federal substantive law controls individual
suits spring from Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v.
Westingkouse Electric Corp.,"' which was decided before Lincoln
Mills. In that case the union brought suit on behalf of some 4,000
employees for back pay. Six justices, in three concurring opinions,
agreed that section 301 should not be interpreted as authorizing a
union to enforce in federal courts the "uniquely personal right of an
employee." Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for three of the six
justices, proceeded from the premise that section 301 did not create
federal substantive rights. This interpretation raised serious constitu-
tional questions whether Congress could thus grant jurisdiction to the
federal courts to enforce contracts governed entirely by state law.
By interpreting section 301 as not reaching suits to enforce terms
Co., 147 Conn. 130, 157 A.2d 918, cert. denied, 364 US. 815 (1960); Food Fair Stores v.
Raynor, 220 Md. 501, 154 A.2d 814 (1959); Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., supra note 44;
Pattenge v. Wagner Iron Works, 275 Wis. 495, 82 N.W.2d 172 (1957).
46. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
47. Id. at 451.
48. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 US. 95, 103 (1962).
49. Ibid.
50. See Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers, 171 F. Supp. 782 (D. Md. 19S9), afI'd, 273
F.2d 614 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 849 (1960); Springer v. Powder Power Tool
Corp., 220 Ore. 102, 348 P.2d 1112 (1960), 13 Stan. L. Rev. 161.
51. 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
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of the collective agreement which are peculiarly for the benefit of
individual employees, the Court could postpone confronting the con-
stitutional issue. Lincoln Mills, however, dissolved the constitutional
problem by rejecting the premise-section 301 did call into being a
body of federal substantive law-and this reason for limiting the
scope of the section has ceased to exist1
2
The distinction drawn in Westinghouse between union rights
and "uniquely personal rights" was from its inception productive of
difficulties and confusion in practical application. 3 Subsequent deci-
sions drained it of meaning and finally abandoned it. In Lincoln Mills,
the Court ordered arbitration of a claim for back pay due employees;
and in the companion case of General Electric Co. v. Local 205,
UEW,54 ordered arbitration of a discharge case. Two justices felt
compelled to reconcile these decisions with Westinghouse by ration-
alizing that the right enforced was the union's own right to arbitration
and not the uniquely personal rights of employees35 In United Steel-
workers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,"0 the Court held that an
arbitrator's award ordering reinstatement and back pay to an em-
ployee who was wrongfully discharged could be specifically enforced
under section 301. No justice even noted that the federal courts
applying federal substantive law were now open to the union to fully
enforce personal rights through the arbitration clause. Finally,
Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney57 demonstrates that transmutation
of personal rights does not require the alchemy of arbitration. The
union there, as.in Westinghouse, sued on behalf of the employees to
recover back wages. The Court made clear that in adjudicating this
claim the state court was bound to apply federal substantive law.
There may remain a thin shadow of possibility that such a suit could
not be brought in the federal courts, but it now seems plain that
union actions to enforce, either directly or through arbitration, terms
of the collective agreement which are peculiarly for the benefit of the
individual employee such as wages, seniority or discharge are governed
by federal substantive law.
52. See Note, Some Problems Relating to Judicial Protection of the Right to Have
Arbitration Agreements Enforced Under Subsection 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 59
Colum. L. Rev. 153 (1959); Comment, Union Enforcement of Individual Employee
Rights Arising From a Collective Bargaining Contract, 21 La. L. Rev. 476 (1961).
53. See Mendelsohn, Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements Under Taft-Hartley
Section 301, 66 Yale L.J. 167, 194 (1956); Note, 41 Cornell L.Q. 320 (1956).
54. 353 U.S. 547 (1957).
55. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 460 (1957) (concurring opinion
of Mr. Justice Burton, joined by Mr. Justice Harlan).
56. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
57. 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
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These cases establish the context but do not decide the specific
question relevant to our inquiry here: Is the suit brought by the
individual employee on his own behalf governed by federal substantive
law? Such a suit presents two discrete legal issues. One is the inter-
pretation of the particular provision of the collective agreement
benefiting the individual-the same issue presented when the union
sues on the individual's behalf. The substantive law applied in de-
ciding this issue should be the same regardless who is the nominal
plaintiff. The test of the validity of the provision, the rules of inter-
pretation, and the considerations brought to bear in resolving am-
biguities ought not be different because the individual rather than
the union brings the suit. The wages due, the order of layoff under the
seniority clause, or the grounds for discharge can not vary with the
form of the suit. To do so would create uncertainty, destroy uni-
formity, and "exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation
and administration of collective agreements."58
The other, and more critical legal issue presented by an indi-
vidual suit is the individual employee's standing to enforce the col-
lective agreement. This has its roots in the fundamental question
of the union's status with relation to the individual. To the extent
that this is, in the first instance, a question of contract interpretation,
,all of the needs enunciated by the Court for applying a single body
of federal law are equally applicable and additionally compelling.
The provisions to be interpreted are the grievance and arbitration
clauses. The question is the relative rights created in the employer,
the union, and the employee to settle grievances, to compel arbitra-
tion, or to be a party to the arbitration proceedings. The rights of
the individual are inseparably entwined with the rights of union and
management to enforce-the very core of actions under section 301.
More importantly, the issue of the individual's standing is not
merely one of contract interpretation, but ultimately raises the ques-
tion whether union and management can, by their contract, deprive
him of standing. The issue then becomes what limits the law places
on the collective parties' power to determine the union's status by
collective agreement. This must be governed by federal substantive
law for it affects the union's status as statutory bargaining agent
under section 9(a). State substantive law can not add to or subtract
from the union's authority to represent, as defined by the federal
statute. Congress has carefully and deliberately struck a balance
between the union and the individual employee, and that balance
can not be disturbed by application of varying and conflicting state
58. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962).
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policies. The rights of individuals, both their right to standing and
their substantive rights, must be governed by federal substantive law.
This result, which requires a comprehensive and exclusive body
of federal law governing all relationships within the collective agree-
ment, is a nearly inevitable consequence of the Court's decision in
Lincoln Mills. The collective agreement creates a complex of relation-
ships between the employer, the union and the employees. It is
designed .to benefit and govern all of the parties as a functioning
institution. A coherent and appropriate body of law can not be
fashioned by pulling threads from the fabric and treating them with
multicolored state law. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his Westinghouse
opinion, clearly foresaw these implications: "If Congress has itself
defined the law or authorized the federal courts to fashion the
judicial rules governing this question, it would be self-defeating to
limit the scope of the power of the federal courts to less than is
necessary to accomplish this Congressional aim.159 And with reference
to the specific question of the rights of individuals under the col-
lective agreement he declared: "It would also be necessary to work
out a federal code governing the interrelationship between the em-
ployee's rights and whatever rights were found to exist in the union." °0
Although federal substantive law controls the rights of the individ-
ual employees under the collective agreement, it does not necessarily
follow that the individual can bring his suit in the federal district
courts. It would be anomalous, however, to find in section 301
authority to impose federal substantive law but no authority for the
federal district court to entertain the suit. The charge of Congress is
to build a body of federal law consonant with national labor policy.
This task would be seriously impeded if all individual suits were
channeled through state courts laboring under the dead weight of
precedents which consistently ignored federal law and federal policy.
A heavier burden would fall on the Supreme Court to enunciate the
principles and fashion the rules, without any assistance from the lower
federal courts. Moreover, neither the words of section 301 nor the
legislative history require this. The critical words of section 301 (a),
"suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization ... ," are equivocal. They have been read by the lower
federal courts as requiring that the suit be between an employer and
a labor organization;"' but the words can as reasonably be read as
59. 348 U.S. at 442 (1955).
60. Id. at 455.
61. United Protective Workers v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F.2d 997 (7th Cir. 1952);
Durandetti v. Chrysler Corp., 195 F. Supp. 653 (EJ). Mich. 1961); Burgos v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 189 F. Supp. 683 (D.PR. 1960); Dimeco v. Fisher, 185 F. Supp. 213 (D.N.J.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 37: 362
HeinOnline  -- 37 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 374 1962
May 1962] INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND ARBITRATION
requiring only that the contract be between an employer and a
labor organization. 62 The primary concern of Congress was to make
unions legally responsible for breach of contract, but underlying this
was the broader purpose of making collective agreements fully en-
forceable. During the House debates both Representative Hartley and
Representative Case endorsed a statement made by Representative
Barden that the section encompassed proceedings "brought by the
employers, the labor organizations, or interested individual employees
under the Declaratory Judgments Act in order to secure declarations
from the Court of legal rights under the contract.013 The principal
argument marshaled against federal courts entertaining individual
suits has been that it would impose a "staggering burden of litiga-
tion."64 The federal courts have already assumed the burden of en-
forcing personal rights when suit is brought by the union.' Suits by
individuals are rare by comparison and would add little to the burden.
From available evidence, state courts now handle less than twenty
such cases a year-something less than a "staggering burden" to
preclude federal courts from entertaining these suits which involve
uniquely federal rights.
III
SOURCES OF FEDERAL SUBSTANTIVE LAW
In fashioning federal substantive law to .define the rights of
individual employees under the collective agreement, the courts must
look to "the policy of our national labor laws.""" Decisions under
1960); Disanti v. Local 53, Glass Workers, 126 F. Supp. 747 (W.). Pa., 1954); Schatte
v. International Alliance of Theatrical Employees, 84 F. Supp. 669 (S.D. Cal. 1949), afi'd
on other grounds, 182 F.2d 158 (9th Cir. 1950).
62. Evolution of the wording of the clause seems to point in this direction. The
Case Bill, as passed by both houses of Congress in 1946, used the words: "Suits for
violation of a contract concluded as a result of collective bargaining between an em-
ployer and a labor organization ... " H.R. 4908, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. § 10(a) (1945).
The Hartley Bill, as passed by the House in 1947, used the words: "Any action for or
proceeding involving a violation of an agreement between an employer and a labor
organization . ... " H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(a) (1947). The Senate re-
verted to the wording of the Case Bill, H.R. 3020 in the Senate, Sec. 301(a). The final
wording was by the Conference Committee, H.R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sees. 23
(1947).
63. 93 Cong. Rec. 3656-57 (1947).
64. Schatte v. International Alliance of Theatrical Employees, 84 F. Supp. 669, 672
(S-D. Cal. 1949), aff'd on other grounds, 182 F.2d 158 (9th Cir. 1950).
65. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his Westinghouse opinion, expressed the fear that
to read § 301 as reaching uniquely personal rights would "open the doors of the federal
courts to a potential flood of grievances." 348 U.S. at 460 (1955). But Lincoln Mills
and subsequent cases opened the doors of the federal courts to the very kind of suits
with which he was concerned.
66. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 US. 448, 456 (1957).
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state law can provide little guidance, for they have not considered,
much less illuminated, the policies or provisions of relevant federal
statutes. Those decisions have evolved no consensus and are instruc-
tive only in defining the basic issue, illustrating the kinds of cases
involved, and suggesting the range of available choice. Guidance in
building a body of federal law must be found in the federal statutes,
by looking both to their express provisions and implicit purposes as
expressive of federal policy. In the words of Mr. Justice Douglas:
The Labor Management Relations Act expressly furnishes some sub-
stantive law. It points out what the parties may or may not do in
certain situations. Other problems will lie in the penumbra of express
statutory mandates. Some will lack express statutory sanction but will
be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a
remedy that will affectuate that policy. 7
Guidance may be gained not only from the LMRA, but also from the
Railway Labor Act and the decisions under that statute which have
defined the rights of the individual under the collective agreement.
Although the statutory schemes differ in detail, the underlying prin-
ciples relevant to our inquiry here are the same. Both give the union
statutory status as bargaining agent, and both contemplate the settle-
ment of disputes arising under the collective agreement through
grievance procedures and arbitration. Both, therefore, pose the basic
issue of the relative rights of the union and the individual employee
to enforce provisions of the contract made for his benefit. There is
no reason to assume that Congress, in accommodating the competing
interests of the union and the individual in the enforcement of the
collective agreement, would strike a different balance because the
employee was a railroad engineer or airplane mechanic rather than
a truck driver or foundry man.
A. The National Labor Relations Act
The central question around which all others hinge is the
statutory authority of the union as bargaining representative of the
employees. This is set forth in section 9(a), which provides that the
majority union
shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such
unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment: Pro-
vided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall
have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer and
to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bar-
gaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent
67. Id. at 457.
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with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in
effect: Provided further, that the bargaining representative has been
given opportunity to be present at such adjustment.Gs
The bare words of the statute make plain four elementary
propositions concerning the status of the union in enforcing the
collective agreement: (1) The statutory right of the union to rep-
resent the employees in negotiating an agreement is different from
its statutory right in settling grievances arising under the agreement.
(2)The statute does not give the union the right of exclusive repre-
sentation in settling grievances, for the proviso expressly permits
grievances to be presented by individual employees and to be adjusted
without intervention of the union. (3) The union has a valid interest
in all grievances and cannot, against its will, be excluded from the
adjustment. (4) The union can insist that all grievance settlements
be consistent with the terms of the collective agreement.
These four propositions do not meet squarely the crucial question
whether the union and the employer can, by agreement, vest in the
union greater control over settling individual grievances than that
granted by the statute. However, the words of the proviso to section
9(a), if given their natural meaning, would seem to speak to this
question. The proviso declares that the individual "shall have the
right at any time to present grievances to their employer and to have
such grievances adjusted." These words, on their face, declare that
an individual has a statutory right to process his grievance to final
adjustment. "Without intervention of the bargaining representative"
would seem to make it clear that the union may not bar the indi-
vidual's asserting a claim or block his obtaining an adjustment.
It has been strongly argued, however, that in spite of its words,
the proviso does not create any rights in the individual employee,
but only makes plain that the employer's duty to bargain with the
majority union is not violated if he chooses to hear and adjust
grievances with individuals. The proviso is not placed in the statute
in the section stating affirmative rights, but is placed in section 9(a)
as a qualification of the majority union's right to represent. Section
8(a)(5) defines the employer's duty to bargain as "subject to the
provisions of section 9 (a)." Therefore, it is argued, the proviso merely
states an exception to the employer's duty to bargain with the major-
ity union as exclusive representative. Furthermore, the employer
has no legal obligation to hear the grievances of his employees when
there is no statutory bargaining agent. He should therefore be free
to agree with the union not to process individual grievances. Finally,
68. NLRA § 9(a), as amended, 61 Star. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1958).
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it is said, no sanction is provided for this claimed right, so it would
be a right without a remedy, a legal contradiction which confirms that
the word "right" was used loosely and not in a Hohfeldian sense.0D
These arguments which limit the effect of the proviso to granting
the employer freedom to hear individual grievances lack persua-
siveness for the following reasons:
First, the argument views the role of section 9(a) in the statutory
scheme too narrowly, for it treats the section as relevant only to the
union's rights against the employer. The function of section 9(a) is
much more wide ranging and profound-it establishes the majority
union as statutory bargaining agent. That status relates not only to
the employer but to other unions and to the employees. Thus, it
affects the rights of other unions to picket 70 or to bargain7' for their
members. Without that status the union violates the individual's
statutory right if itpretends to bargain for him without his consent; "
with that status the union can make an agreement which truncates
his right to refrain from union activity 3 And the status may simul-
taneously affect different parties in different ways. Thus, if an indi-
vidual employee and his employer make an employment contract
which conflicts with the collective agreement, the employee would
merely be barred from enforcing the contract but the employer would
be guilty of an unfair labor practice. 4
The broad function of section 9(a) is to establish the status of
the majority union, and the purpose of the proviso is to define that
status, not only with reference to the employer but also with reference
to the employees. The proviso ought not to be viewed merely as a
69. See Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601, 621-24
(1956); McRee, The Adversely Affected Employee and the Grievance and Arbitration
Process, in Symposium on Labor Relations Law 431 (Slovenko ed. 1961); Note, 34 Ind.
L.J. 462 (1959).
70. NLRA § 8(b)(4)(C), as amended, 73 Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)
(C) (Supp. II, 1959-1960); § 8(b)(7), added by 73 Stat. 544 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158
(b) (7) (Supp. I1, 1959-1960).
71. In the absence of a majority union, a minority union can bargain for Its own
members. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938). When a majority
union is present, a minority union cannot represent its members, even in processing
grievances. Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945).
72. International Ladies' Garment Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961). The
union may then be barred from representing even its own members until the effects of
its unfair labor practice have been dissipated.
73. NLRA § 8(a) (3), as amended, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (3) (Supp. II, 1959-1960); § 8(b) (2), added by 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(2) (1958).
74. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342
(1944); J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944). See Weyand, Majority Rule In
Collective Bargaining, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 556 (1945).
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misplaced part of section 8(a) (5), nor should its words granting
rights to individuals be construed solely to confer a privilege upon
employers.7" It speaks directly to the relative rights of the union and
the individual in the enforcement of the collective agreement.
Second, the argument that because the employer can refuse to
hear individual grievances when there is no majority union, he can
agree with the union not to hear such grievances, does not meet the
critical issue.76 Although the employer may refuse to listen, he cannot
by turning a deaf ear bar the individual from legally enforcing his
employment contract. Whether the employer can agree with the
union to listen only through the established grievance procedure is
a subsidiary problem with which we are not here principally con-
cerned.77 The critical issue is whether the employer by such an agree-
ment can use the union's silence to bar the individual from legally
enforcing his claim. If the employer could so agree, then the indi-
vidual would have fewer legal rights than before. The end result
would be that although the collective agreement prescribed the terms
of the individual employment contract, the employee would have
no enforceable rights under his employment contract. In practice, if
not in theory, the rights would belong solely to the union.
Third, the absence of sanctions to enforce the "right" stated in
the proviso does not prevent that proviso from being given effect
when an individual brings suit under section 301 to enforce his rights
under the collective agreement. The individual seeks to use the proviso
only to nullify a term of the collective agreement, which he claims
the union as bargaining agent had no authority to make. In out-
lining the sources of substantive law to be applied, Mr. justice
Douglas explained, "Other problems will lie in the penumbra of ex-
press statutory mandates. Some will lack express statutory sanction
75. Under NLRB v. American Natl Ins. Co., 343 US. 395 (1952), the employer
might be free to bargain to impasse for the right to adjust grievances with individual
employees without relying on the proviso of § 9(a). If this is true, then the proviso
adds nothing to the statute except as it secures rights for individual employees. In
addition, it has been argued that the employer is permitted to hear grievances of the
employees by the proviso of § 8(a) (2), and therefore § 9(a) must have an effect beyond
creating a bare privilege for the employer. See Dunau, Employee Participation in the
Grievance Aspect of Collective Bargaining, S0 Colum. L. Rev. 731, 741-42 (1950).
76. The General Counsel of the NLRB has ruled that § 9(a) does not require an
employer to deal with a minority group of employees who request a wage increase,
Admin. Ruling of the NLRB Gen. Counsel, Case No. 317, 30 L.R.R.M. 1103 (June 2,
1952), or meet with a discharged employee and his lawyer to discuss the discharge,
Admin. Ruling of the NLRB Gen. Counsel, Case No. 418, 31 L.R.R.M. 1039 (Nov. 3,
1952). Neither of these reaches the question of the validity or legal effect of contractual
provisions purporting to give the union exclusive control over grievances.
77. This subsidiary problem is discussed in text accompanying notes 108-13 infra.
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but will be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and
fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy. 7 8
Fourth, there may in fact be sanctions to enforce this right. If
the function of the proviso is, as has been suggested above, to strike
a balance between the power of the union and the rights of the indi-
vidual, and to mark the limits of the union's authority, then various
sanctions are available to keep the union within those limits. Where
the union negotiates an agreement which oversteps its statutory
authority to the injury of individual rights, the courts can use their
broad equitable power to enjoin application of the offensive pro-
visions7 9 or the NLRB can use the administrative remedy of re-
moving certification. 0 In addition, violation of the right granted by
the proviso may be an unfair labor practice. Section 7 guarantees
employees not only the right to bargain collectively and engage in
other concerted activities, but also "the right to refrain from any
or all such activities." These rights are obviously qualified by section
9(a) to the extent that the statutory status of the majority union
circumscribes the individual's right to refrain from bargaining col-
lectively. If the proviso is read as limiting the union's authority over
the individual, any agreement between the union and the employer
which gives the union greater control over disposition of grievances
invades the individual's right to refrain from bargaining collectively
as guaranteed by section 7, and may therefore be a violation of
sections 8(a)(1) and 8(b)(1).1 The plain words of the proviso
creating an affirmative right can not be brushed aside as lacking
enforcing sanctions.
The words of the proviso in section 9(a), when viewed in the
context of the total statutory structure, point strongly in the direction
of giving the individual a right to enforce substantive provisions in
a collective agreement without being subject to the union's veto. The
78. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 457 (1956).
79. Syres v. Oil Workers, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) (mem.). Compare Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952); Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen, 338 U.S. 332 (1949); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
80. Hughes Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 318 (1953), enforced as modified, 147 F.2d 69
(5th Cir. 1945).
81. See Sherman, The Individual and His Grievance-Whose Grievance Is It?, 11
U. Pitt. L. Rev. 35, 53-54 (1949); ABA Report on Individual Grievances 33, 62-63, S0
Nw. U.L. Rev. at 178-79 (1955). Giving the union such control to enforce or waive the
provisions of the collective agreement which benefit the individual and govern his terms
and conditions of employment might also be a violation of §§ 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2). This
would be equivalent to giving the union unilateral control over seniority, which has
been held to be unlawful. NLRB v. Dallas Gen. Drivers, 228 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1956);
NLRB v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 225 F.2d 343 (8th Cir. 1955).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 37:362
HeinOnline  -- 37 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 380 1962
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND ARBITRATION
legislative history of the proviso, although clouded, throws some
shafts of light for additional guidance! 2
The origin of the proviso goes back to section 9(a) of the
Wagner Act which qualified the union's status as exclusive repre-
sentative with the words: "Provided, That any individual employee
or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to present
grievances to their employer. 8 3 Although the intent of the framers
is unclear as to the scope of the qualification, it does appear that the
proviso was to do more than merely limit the employer's duty to
bargain.84 Wording the clause as granting an affirmative right was
not accidental, for words without an affirmative grant were proposed
and rejected."5 The clause was modeled on a rule previously stated
by the Railway Labor Board which prohibited the parties from
making collective agreements encroaching on the individual's right
to present grievances.8 6
Cases interpreting this proviso involved only the employer's
duty to bargain. However, in Hughes Tool Co.,sT the National Labor
Relations Board spelled out the relative roles of the individual, the
union and the employer in processing and adjusting grievances. It
interpreted the proviso to mean that individuals were entitled to
appear "in behalf of themselves ... at every stage of the grievance
procedure" and that the union was also entitled to be present and
negotiate at each stage 88 With reference to the power of the union
to make a binding settlement, the Board stated:
If, at any level of the established grievance procedure, there is an
agreement between the employer, the exclusive representative, and the
individual or group, disposition of the grievance is thereby achieved.
82. For studies of the legislative history of this proviso see Dunau, Employee Par-
ticpation in the Grievance Aspect of Collective Bargaining, So Colum. L. Rev. 721
(1950); Sherman, supra note 81; Shugerman, Individual Employee Grievance Under
Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts, 1949 Wis. L. Rev. 154; ABA Report on Individual
Grievances 33, 62-63, 50 Nw. L. Rev. at 178-79 (1955).
83. 49 Stat. 453 (1935).
84. See Hearings on H.R. 6288 Before the House Committee on Labor, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 210-11 (1935); Hearings on S. 1958 Before the Senate Committee on Education
and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess, pt. 3, at 321 (1935).
85. Secretary Perkins proposed a wording which merely stated that nothing in the
statute should impair the individual's existing rights to present grievances. This wording
was rejected and words of affirmative grant were used. Hearings on H.R. 6288 Before
the House Committee on Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 301 (1935).
86. "No such agreement shall infringe, however, upon the right of employees not
members of the organization representing the majority to present grievances either
in person or by representatives of their own choice." International Ass'n of Mlachinists,
2 R.L.B. 87, 96 (1921).
87. 56 N.L.R.B. 981 (1944), enforced as modified, 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945).
88. Id. at 982.
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Failing agreement of all three parties, any dissatisfied party may carry
the grievance through subsequent machinery until the established
grievance procedure is exhausted.89
On the effect to be given a contract provision creating a grievance
procedure controlled by the union, the Board made clear that al-
though the individual must process his grievance through the steps
of the contractual grievance procedure, "where the contract provides
for presentation by a union representative . . . the individual em-
ployee or group of employees has the right to present his or its
grievance in person."9 Finally, the Board made explicit that "any
adjustment must be consistent in its substantive aspects"'" with
the terms of the collective agreement.
The import of the proviso in the Board's view was that the
union could not settle the grievance without the consent of the indi-
vidual, nor could it by an agreement with the employer bar the em-
ployee from processing his claim to final adjustment. The court of
appeals apparently agreed with the Board on this point, for it stated:
"We understand the Board . . . to hold that individuals and groups
may, under the statute, fully prosecute their grievances through all
stages and appeals." 92
Shortly after the Hughes Tool decision, the Supreme Court de-
cided Elgin, Joliet & Eastern R.R. v. Burley,9 3 which arose under
the Railway Labor Act but which helped shape the 1947 changes
in section 9(a). In that case a group of employees filed a grievance
through the union, claiming back pay for alleged violations of starting
time provisions in the collective agreement. The claim was processed
through the grievance procedure to the final step where the union
agreed to withdraw the grievance in return for an explicit provision
establishing rights for such violations in the future, and the settle-
ment of various other grievances. The employees, dissatisfied with
this result, brought suit for back pay, and the company defended on
the grounds that the union had settled the grievances. The Court
held that, in the absence of any showing of authorization by the
individual employees, the union did not have the power to surrender
their claims."' The Court drew a distinction between the union's
89. Id. at 982-83.
90. Id. at 983.
91. Ibid.
92. Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69, 73 (5th Cir. 1945).
93. 325 U.S. 711 (1945), aff'd on rehearing, 327 U.S. 661 (1946).
94. On rehearing, the Court affirmed but elaborated on what might constitute
authorization to the union to settle or to submit the cases to the National Railroad
Adjustment Board. 327 U.S. 661 (1946).
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power to negotiate collective agreements and its power to settle
grievances:
It would be difficult to believe that Congress intended, by the 1934
amendments, to submerge wholly the individual and minority interests
* * .not only in forming the contracts which govern the employment
relation, but also in giving effect to them and to all other incidents of
that relation. Acceptance of such a view would require the clearest
expression of purpose. For this would mean that Congress had nullified
all preexisting rights of workers to act in relation to their employment,
including perhaps even the fundamental right to consult with one's
employer except as the collective agent might permit.95
To the argument that the union was granted the power to make
binding settlements by the collective agreement, the Court replied:
The collective agreement could not be effective to deprive the employees
of their individual rights. Otherwise those rights would be brought
within the collective bargaining power by a mere exercise of that power,
contrary to the purport and effect of the Act as excepting them from
its scope and reserving them to the individuals aggrieved.3
These two cases are important not as authoritative statements
of federal labor policy or irreversible precedents, but as integral parts
of the legislative history of section 9(a) in its present form. They
help frame the purposes of the Taft-Hartley amendment and thereby
illuminate the congressional policy to be effectuated in suits under
section 301. The amendment added to the previous words of the
proviso the following: "and to have such grievances adjusted, with-
out the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the
adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargain-
ing contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further, That the
bargaining representative has been given an opportunity to be present
at such adjustment."97
The purposes of adding these words are clouded by the cus-
tomary imprecision of committee reports and legislative debates, but
through the clouds three guideposts emerge quite dearly. First, the
discussion was almost entirely in terms of the individual's rights,
and the proviso was viewed through the eyes of the individual em-
ployee. Concern focused not on the duty of the employer to bargain,
but on the relative rights of the individual and the union.08 Second,
the words added to the proviso were framed with explicit reference
95. 325 U.S. at 733-34.
96. Id. at 744.
97. NLRA § 9(a), as amended, 61 StaL 143 (1947), 29 US.C. § 1S9(a) (1958).
98. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 24 (1947); H. Rep. No. 510,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1947); H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 34 (1947);
93 Cong. Rec. 3624-25, 4904 (1947).
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to the prior decisions. The Hughes Tool case was in the forefront of
congressional debates; 99 and the effect of the proviso was measured
against the Supreme Court's decision in Elgin, Joliet & Eastern R.R.
v. Burley.100 Third, at a very minimum Congress intended to secure by
statute the individual rights recognized by the Board in Hughes
Tool, and to adopt the principle of Elgin, Joliet.10'
One of the dominant themes in the enactment of Taft-Hartley
was to protect the individual employee from being wholly submerged
by the collective bargaining structures. The proviso of section 9(a)
was listed by Representative Hartley as a part of a "bill of rights"
for individual workers, along with the right to choose the majority
representative; the right not to be discharged when expelled from
the union, and the right to vote on union security contracts.10 2 These
were not shadow rights protected only when championed by the em-
ployer; they were rights protected against both union and employer
and not destructible by their collective agreement.
Both the external evidence of legislative history and the internal
evidence of the words of section 9(a), read in the context of the
statutory structure, point in the same general direction. From the
words and the legislative history emerge guidelines for fashioning the
federal substantive law under section 301:
(1) The individual employee has rights under the collective
agreement, the enforcement of which are not subject to the union's
exclusive control.0 3
(2) The union and the employer cannot block the enforcement
of these rights by agreeing between themselves that those rights can
be compromised or ignored without the individual employee's consent
or authorization.
99. See particularly the committee reports cited note 98 supra.
100. During the debates Representative Owens stated: "Is it not a fact that we
have gone in accord with the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States,
which hold that where employees have a grievance, for instance in connection with the
recovery of a certain amount of money claimed due from an employer, they can go to
him and complain about it and settle it without the bargaining agent." 93 Cong. Ree.
3625 (1947). Representative Hartley agreed that this was correct. Ibid.
101. Congress also had before it the decisions of the then defunct National War
Labor Board which had taken a position contrary to the holding of Elgin, Joliet, and
the dictum of Hughes Tool. See Douglas Aircraft Co., 25 War Lab. Rep. 57 (1945).
The position of the NWLB found no support in Congress, even among those who
opposed the bill. The Senate minority report agreed that the amendment to the proviso
"sjpelled out desirable grievance procedures." S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 2, 41 (1947).
102. 93 Cong. Rec. 3535 (1947).
103. Some substantive provisions, such as those for a union shop, check-off, release
time for union stewards and use of the bulletin boards create no substantive rights in the
employees but only rights in the union.
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(3) The individual rights are limited by the substantive terms
of the collective agreement.
(4) The union has an interest in all terms of the collective
agreement and a right to insist on the enforcement of the agreement.
B. The Railway Labor Act
Additional guidance in delineating the rights of individual em-
ployees under the collective agreement can be drawn from the Rail-
way Labor Act. This act, which was the precursor of the Wagner
Act, established as national labor policy the primary principle that
the majority union should be the exclusive representative for purposes
of collective bargaining. The federal courts, in applying the statute,
have been confronted with problems comparable to those which will
arise under section 301, and have sought to develop working rules
which will balance the needs and interests of the union and the
individual.
The most relevant difference between the two statutes is that
the Railway Labor Act requires that grievances which the parties
are unable to adjust by the usual process of negotiation be submitted
to the National Railroad Adjustment Board for determination. Those
determinations are enforceable in the federal courts. But even this
difference can be overstated, for the function of the statutorily created
Adjustment Board is generally comparable to that of contractually
created grievance arbitration enforced under section 301.
Prior to 1945, the unions insisted that the individual employee
had no right to process his grievance and carry it to the Adjustment
Board. 04 They insisted that they were the exclusive representatives
not only for negotiating agreements but also for settling grievances
arising under such agreements. In Elgin, Joliet & Eastern R.R. v.
Burley,105 the Supreme Court, relying on statutory language far
less explicit than the proviso to section 9(a), squarely rejected this
view. So far as grievances were concerned, the individual had rights
"to share in the negotiations, to be heard before the Board, to have
notice, and to bring the enforcement suit." 100 These rights could
not be foreclosed by the union's settling his claim without his consent.
Nor could an award of the Board be effective as against him unless
he had authorized the union to present his case or had been given
notice and opportunity to be heard.107
104. See Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 205 (1944); US. Attorney
General's Comm. on Administrative Procedure, Administrative Procedure in Govern-
ment Agencies, S. Doc. No. 10, 77th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 4, at 7 (1941).
105. 325 US. 711 (1945).
106. Id. at 736.
107. Authority of the union to settle the claim or to present it to the Board can be
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The holding in Elgin, Joliet that the union does not have ex-
clusive power to settle or appeal an employee's grievance has required
the federal courts to develop rules governing the individual's process-
ing and enforcing his own claim. It now seems generally accepted,
both by the parties and the courts, that the individual can file his
grievance without going through the union.10s However, he must
process it "in the usual manner," which means that he must follow
the contractual grievance procedure. Thus, in the lower steps he may
not be entitled to be represented by counsel"' or by a minority
union"' unless the contract so permits, and the bargaining repre-
sentative is entitled to receive notice and to participate in accordance
with the contract.1 1' Moreover, the individual may not settle the
grievance without the union's consent, for as the Court recognized
in Elgin, Joliet, both collective and individual interests are involved
when the dispute arises from the terms of a collective agreement. 112
The process thus required is remarkably similar to that described by
the NLRB in Hughes Tool." 3
When the individual has exhausted the grievance procedure in
seeking to enforce his claim, his resort is not to the courts but to the
Adjustment Board, for it has exclusive primary jurisdiction over
individual claims as well as claims of unions and employers.114 As
express or implied. It might be found in the individual's filing his grievance through the
union, in his knowledge that his grievance was being discussed, and remaining silent,
or if he is a union member, it might be found in the union constitution. But such au-
thority can not be obtained by the bootstrap device of including it in the collective
agreement. 325 U.S. at 744-48; 327 U.S. 661 at 664-67 (1946) (on rehearing).
108. Kroner, Minor Disputes Under the Railway Labor Act: A Critical Appraisal,
37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 41, 48 (1962).
109. D'Amico v. Pennsylvania R.R., 191 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
110. Butler v. Thompson, 192 F.2d 831, 833 (8th Cir. 1951); Broady v. Illinois
Cent. R.R., 191 F.2d 73, 76 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 897 (1951); Roberts v.
Thompson, 107 F. Supp. 775, 776 (ED. Ark. 1952).
111. See Kroner, Disciplinary Hearings Under the Railway Labor Act: A Survey of
Adjustment Board Awards, 46 Minn. L. Rev. 277, 300-02 (1961).
112. "To leave settlements in such cases ultimately to the several choices of the mem-
bers, each according to his own desire without regard to the effect upon the collective
interest, would mean that each affected worker would have the right to choose his own
terms and to determine the meaning and effect of the collective agreement for himself.
... To give the collective agent power to make the agreement, but exclude It from any
voice whatever in its interpretation would go far toward destroying its uniform ap-
plication." 325 U.S. at 737 n.35.
113. 56 N.L.R.B. 981 (1944).
114. The one exception is that an employee who is discharged can treat his discharge
as final and sue for damages. This is a shriveled remnant of Moore v. Illinois Cent. R.R.,
312 U.S. 630 (1941), which now has very restricted application, see Transcontinental
& W. Air, Inc. v. Koppal, 345 U.S. 653 (1953), but which the Court has not yet over-
ruled. See Pennsylvania R.R. v. Day, 360 U.S. 548, 553 (1959).
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the Supreme Court pointed out in Pennsylvania KR. v. Day,"5 the
"need for experience and expert knowledge" and the "need for
uniformity of interpretation and orderly adjustment of differences"-""
is the same regardless of who is the claimant. In the proceedings
before the Adjustment Board, the union is an interested party repre-
senting the collective interests of other employees in the interpreta-
tion of the contract. The individual is entitled at this stage to be
represented by any person or union of his choice."'
The individual employee may not only carry his own case to
the Adjustment Board, but he is also entitled to notice and the
opportunity to be heard in proceedings which effectively adjudicate
his rights under the collective agreement. In Estes v. Union Terminal
Co.,11 the union filed a grievance claiming that one employee, Lane,
had improperly been given seniority over certain other employees.
It carried the case to the Board and won, but the company refused
to comply with the award on the grounds that Lane had been given
no notice. To the argument that Lane was not entitled to notice, the
court replied:
[E]very person who may be adversely affected by an order entered by
the Board should be given reasonable notice of the hearing .... No
man should be deprived of his means of livelihood without a fair op-
portunity to defend himself. Plainly, that is the intent of the law. The
case at bar illustrates how a single employee may be caught between the
upper and nether millstones in a controversy to which only a labor
organization and a carrier are parties before the Board.110
This right to notice and hearing was solidified by Elgin, Joliet, and
has been applied in subsequent cases involving competing claims of
groups of employees1 20
The unifying purpose of these decisions under the Railway Labor
115. 360 U.S. 548 (1959).
116. Id. at 551.
117. 40 Ops. Att'y Gen. 494, 495 (1946). Under the NLRA the rule on repreenta-
tion is somewhat different; the individual may be represented by a friend or even a
lawyer, but not by a minority union. Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69, 73 (5th
Cir. 1945). See discussion in Dunau, Employee Participation in the Grievance Aspect
of Collective Bargaining, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 731, 751-54 (1950).
118. 89 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1937).
119. Id. at 770. The court held that formal notice was not necessary, and found
that Lane had actual knowledge of the proceedings and relied on the employer to
protect his interests. Therefore, allowing him to intervene in the court proceedings would
afford him due process of law. See also Nord v. Griffin, 86 F.2d 481 (7th Cir.), cerL
denied, 300 US. 673 (1936); Primakow v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 56 F. Supp.
413 (Ef-. Wis. 1943).
120. Order of R.. Telegraphers v. New Orleans T. & Al. Ry., 229 F.2d 59 (8th Cir.
1956); Allain v. Tummon, 212 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1954); Hunter v. Atchison, T. & S.F.
Ry., 171 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1948).
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Act is to provide the individual employee procedural due process
in having his substantive rights under the collective agreement de-
termined.121 The very essence of procedural due process is to have
those rights determined by an impartial tribunal. In Edwards v.
Capital Airlines, 2 the union protested that two pilots had been
given seniority status greater than that to which they were entitled,
and carried the dispute to a system board of adjustment. The two
pilots appeared with lawyers who argued in their behalf, but the
system board, made up only of representatives of the union and the
carrier, ruled against them. In a suit to enjoin enforcement of the
award, the court held that the collective contract provision making
the board's award final and binding could not foreclose the rights
of a minority group when the union representing the interests of the
many was actively an adversary party. "Persons in their situation
must have available to them, at some point, an impartial look at a
decision, thus made, denying their claims to substantial rights. This
is the time-honored function of an equity court.' 23 Recognizing that
the award was "presumptively valid," the court nonetheless declared
the seniority provisions to be clear, interpreted them, and modified
the decision of the system board. Even a decision of the Adjustment
Board itself can be reviewed on the grounds that members of the
Board, as officers of the union, had adverse interests such as to justify
an inference of bias.124
121. Although the employee has no right of judicial review from an adverse decision
of the Adjustment Board, the courts can and must determine whether the employee has
been denied due process of law in the proceedings. Ellerd v. Southern Pac. R.R., 241
F.2d 541 (7th Cir. 1957). See Union Pac. R.R. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601, 616-17 (1959);
Barnett v. Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines, 245 F.2d 579, 582 (3d Cir. 1957).
122. 176 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
123. Id. at 761. In Arnold v. United Airlines, Inc., 296 F.2d 191 (7th Cir. 1961), a
union-employer board empowered to settle grievance disputes intentionally reached a
deadlock, hoping thereby to escape a charge of bias by enabling an arbitrator to decide
the case before it. The aggrieved employees, however, seemed to lack full confidence In
a "neutral" so named.
124. Hornsby v. Dobard, 291 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1961). The make-up of the Ad-justment Board creates serious doubts as to fairness when cases are brought by In-
dividuals or unions not members of the Board. See Kroner, Minor Disputes Under the
Railway Labor Act: A Critical Appraisal, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 41, 46-48 (1962); Rose, The
Railway Labor Act and the Jurisdiction of the Courts, 8 Lab. LJ. 9 (1957); Comment,
Railway Labor Disputes and the National Railroad Adjustment Board, 18 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 303 (1951). The problem is especially acute when an employee Is discharged for
failure to comply with a union security provision, for the interests of the union are
always adverse and the Board's tri-partite structure gives no guarantee of fairness. See
Brady v. Trans World Airlines, 156 F. Supp. 82 (D. Del. 1957), modified on rchearlng,
167 F. Supp. 469 (D. Del. 1958). For a practical solution developed for this problem
see text accompanying notes 165-68 infra.
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C. The Needs of Collective Bargaining
Both the National Labor Relations Act and the Railway Labor
Act express the basic national policy of reliance on collective bargain-
ing as a system of industrial government. Section 301 is but a segment
of the statutory framework supporting and shaping that system, and
the courts in constructing rules to govern the rights of individual
employees should seek to further, not frustrate, the purposes of col-
lective bargaining. But the purposes to be furthered are not simply
those of the collective entities-union and management. The con-
trolling purposes are those of the statute, for collective bargaining,
a private institution, is charged with a public function.'
Collective bargaining as conceived by the statute vests in the
union collective power to enable it to bargain effectively with the
employer, but the purpose of giving the union that power is to benefit
the employees. The function of the collective agreement is not only to
stabilize the relationship of the collective parties, but also to estab-
lish terms and conditions of employment for the employees. Nor are
the interests of the employees conceived in narrow economic terms,
for one of the dominant purposes of collective bargaining is to protect
employees from arbitrary or unequal treatment-to bring a sense of
justice to the workplace. The role of the collective agreement is to
substitute general rules for unchanneled discretion; wages are not
based on whimsy but on established rates, layoffs are not governed
by favoritism but by seniority provisions, discharges are not based
upon vindictive bias but upon just cause found after objective in-
quiry. As the Labor Study Group of the Committee for Economic
Development has so well stated:
A major achievement of collective bargaining, perhaps its most im-
portant contribution to the American workplace, is the creation of a
system of industrial jurisprudence, a system under which employer and
employee rights are set forth in contractual form and disputes over the
meaning of the contract are settled through a rational grievance process
usually ending, in the case of unresolved disputes, with arbitration. The
gains from this system are especially noteworthy because of their effect
on the recognition and dignity of the individual worker.,2
125. Congress, in amending § 9(a), made dear that it did not believe that exclusive
control by the union over grievances was essential for collective bargaining to fulfill the
statutory purpose. At the very least, § 9(a) upholds contracts which deny unions such
exclusive control. Indeed, the legislative history makes it unmistakably clear that Congress
considered such contracts preferable.
126. Comm. for Economic Development, The Public Interest in National Labor
Policy 32 (1961). The importance of the collective agreement and its observance for
the individual is underlined by § 104 of the LMRDA, which requires that the union
provide employees with copies of the collective agreement. One of the purposes of this
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The needs of collective bargaining, thus conceived, inevitably
look two ways-toward the interests of the collective parties and
their relationship, and toward the interests of the employees and
their individual rights. The need for an effective union to obtain
benefits and establish rules carries with it a need for individuals to
receive those benefits according to the rules. The need for the col-
lective parties to resolve disputes and meet changed conditions during
the contract has a concurrent need for the individual to be fairly
treated according to general rules. In framing the legal rules, the
multiple needs of collective bargaining cannot be fully served by
looking only to the collective relationship; for one of the major
functions of collective bargaining may be frustrated if the employees'
interest in fair and equal treatment under established rules is not
given significant weight.
If the law looks only to the needs and desires of union and
management, it may give little protection to the individual. Both of
the collective parties are primarily concerned with managing their
relationship, and that is simplified by giving the union exclusive
control over the prosecution of grievances. Three uses of the grievance
procedure in managing the collective relationship are particularly
relevant in defining individual rights. First, the grievance procedure
is used to complete the collective agreement. Contract provisions
may be intentionally silent or vague, or they may unwittingly leave
gaps, include inconsistent terms, or fail to foresee future problems.
Whatever its source, ambiguity reveals that the agreement is incom-
plete and requires continued bargaining. The forum for bargaining
is the grievance procedure, and the unsettled rule is illustrated by a
particular grievance. The process of completion is akin to the original
negotiation of the agreement, and the collective parties have primary
interests in evolving the general rule to fill out the agreement. But
this bargaining process is more confined than the original negotiation,
for the parties normally expect that the grievance will be settled
within the range of reasonable interpretations which can be drawn
from guides in the agreement, and if they are unable to settle the
dispute, it will be resolved by arbitration. 127
Second, the grievance procedure may be used to change the
collective agreement and serve the needs of flexibility."2 8 During cut-
provision was to enable employees to insist that the collective agreement be followed
and their rights not bartered away by the union officers.
127. For an analysis of the dual role of the grievance procedure in "legislating" new
employment standards and "administering" established standards, particularly with
reference to individual rights, see Dunau, Employee Participation in the Grievance Aspect
of Collective Bargaining, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 731, 747-51 (1950).
128. One of the arguments most commonly used against recognition of Individual
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backs in employment the employer may lay off all women employees
and retain men with lesser seniority or impose layoffs instead of
spreading the work as required by the seniority clause. - The union,
by refusing to appeal the grievances, accepts an informal modification
of the agreement. The purposes of both collective parties are served
by the freedom to improvise exceptions to the general rules of the
agreement. Of course, the line between changing the contract and
completing the contract is indistinct, but the line is crossed when the
settlement is beyond the range of reasonable interpretation of the
agreement or contravenes a previously established rule. The indis-
tinctness of the dividing line does not obliterate the essential dif-
ference in the two uses of the grievance procedure.
Third, the grievance procedure may be used as a clearing house
for balancing off unrelated claims. Grievances may be bargained
against each other, the employer granting one in return for the union's
surrendering another. This may serve a useful and legitimate function,
but also can raise serious problems. In Guzzo v. United Steelworkers,"'°
the union called a strike during the contract term. The employer sued
the union for damages and singled out one employee for discharge.
The union protested the discharge as discriminatory and processed the
employee's grievance up to arbitration, but at that point the union
agreed to withdraw the grievance in return for the employer's dropping
his suit against the union. When the grievance procedure becomes
clogged, large numbers of grievances may be settled in a wholesale
exchange. Thus in Elgin, Joliet, the union's surrender of back pay
claims was part of a package settlement of sixty-one different griev-
ances.
3 1
From the union's institutional viewpoint, exclusive control over
grievances enhances the union's prestige and authority. Through
the prosecution of grievances it can daily demonstrate its effectiveness
as guardian of the employee's interests; successful settlement builds
bonds of loyalty from those benefited; and refusal to process under-
scores the union's authority. Conversely, grievances settled with
rights under the collective agreement is that "a prime function of the grievance pro-
cedure is to secure uniformity in interpreting the agreement and building up a 'aw of
the plant' with respect to matters not spelled out in the agreement." Ostrofsky v. United
Steelworkers, 171 F. Supp. 782, 790 (D. Ald. 1959). See discussion in Cox, Individual
Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 8 Lab. L.J. 850, 855 (1957). This
argument puts the shoe on the wrong foot, for it is the individual who insists on uni-
formity-that he be treated according to the "law of the plant?' which governs all
others under the agreement. It is the collective parties who insist on exceptions, varia-
tions and departure from uniformity.
129. See, e.g., Cortez v. Ford Motor Co., 349 Mlich. 108, 84 N.W.2d 523 (1957).
130. 47 L.R.RM. 2379 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1960), cerL denied, 365 U.S. 802 (1961).
131. 325 US. at 712, 715.
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individuals or other unions makes the majority union appear unneces-
sary, if not ineffective, and creates conflicting loyalties. More im-
portantly, the union as representative of all of the employees has a
collective interest in the individual's claim. If the claim is granted,
it may be at the expense of other employees-seniority, promotion,
and job assignment cases are only the most obvious examples. If
the claim is denied, it may provide a precedent which casts a cloud
over other employees' rights. The union has not only an interest but a
responsibility to protect the other employees' rights. In addition, it
has a separable institutional interest that the bargain it has made
not be remade or frittered away by individual action.
From management's viewpoint, vesting exclusive control over
grievances in the union simplifies contract administration. Friction and
distrust on the part of the union are reduced, and all grievances are
funneled through a single established procedure which orders appeals
up the chain of management control. Most important, it simplifies
management's obtaining definite answers to questions arising under
the collective agreement. Grievances settled with the union cannot
return to haunt management in the form of individual claims; dis-
pensations granted by union officers cannot be challenged by indi-
vidual employees. The employer can proceed with full security, for
the union's control over the grievance procedure shields him from pos-
sible liability to his employees.
These needs and desires of the collective parties, and their use
of the grievance procedure to manage their collective relationship are
all served by giving the union exclusive control over the grievance
procedure. Obviously, not all of these needs are equally compelling
nor the desires worthy of fulfillment in the same measure. More im-
portant, however, many of these needs do not require such totality of
union control, or may be adequately met through other methods. The
purpose here is only to identify the principal collective needs, not to
prescribe the measure or method of meeting them. That must be done
through specifying the design of the substantive law.
The needs of collective bargaining look also to the interests of
the employees and their individual rights. In simple economic terms,
the individual's interest is often of first magnitude, for more than three-
fourths of the cases coming to the courts involve seniority rights or
disciplinary discharges. The individual's very livelihood is at stake.
In personal terms, loss of seniority undermines his sense of security,
and discharge darkens his good name. Making the union the exclusive
representative for processing grievances subordinates those interests
of individual employees and endangers interests which collective bar-
gaining purposes to protect.
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The grievance procedure is particularly susceptible to abuse, for
through it individuals or goups may be singled out for arbitrary
treatment. In DiSanti v. United Glass Workers,13 2 a former union
officer bid for and was given a promotion. The grievance committee,
dominated by his political rival, insisted that he be removed from the
job and management complied. And in Woodward Iron Co. v. Ware,'3
two employees who had been discharged sought to persuade the union
to process their grievances but their request was summarily rejected
by hostile members. Seniority grievances are especially vulnerable to
discrimination. In Edwards v. Capital Airlines, 34 two pilots who had
been reinstated found themselves pitted against all those lower on
the seniority list; the union officers cast aside the contract and em-
braced the majority. And in Cortez v. Ford Motor Co.,13" women who
were systematically laid off in violation of the seniority provision found
that the local union president had informally arranged with the em-
ployer that regardless of the contract, men should have preference.
The danger of unfairness is magnified and its presence obscured when
the grievance depends on a disputed issue of fact. Thus, in Cortez,
the union thinly veiled its discrimination by claiming that the jobs
were too heavy for women; and in Matter of Soto 30 the union conceded
that unwanted employees had engaged in a slowdown. Most grievances
involve some factual issue, and the union, by rejecting the employees'
version, can act "responsible" and wear the face of fairness.
The individual's interest may more often be vitiated without
vindictiveness or deliberate discrimination.1 37 Incomplete investigation
of the facts, reliance on untested evidence, or colored evaluation of
witnesses may lead the union to reject grievances which more objective
inquiry would prove meritorious. Union officials burdened with
institutional concerns may be willing to barter unrelated grievances
or accept wholesale settlements if the total package is advantageous,
even though some good grievances are lost. Concern for collective
interests and the needs of the enterprise may dull the sense of personal
injustice. Thus in Union News Co. v. Hildreth,38 the management of
a restaurant found that the food costs were out of line with past
experience, a fact indicating wastage, serving too large portions, or
132. 40 L.R.R. 2548 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1957).
133. 261 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1958).
134. 176 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
135. 349 Mich. 108, 84 N.V.2d 523 (1957).
136. 7 N.Y.2d 397, 165 N.E.2d 855, 198 N.YS.2d 282 (1960).
137. See, e.g., Donato v. American Locomotive Co., 283 App. Div. 410, 127 N.Y.S.2d
709 (3d Dep't 1954), and Fray v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 9 Wis. 2d 631, 10 N.W.2d
782 (1960), where grievances were lost because of the union's delay in prosecuting them.
138. 295 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961).
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theft. Unable to discover who or what was at fault, management
picked five of the twelve employees at random and replaced them.
When food costs appeared to go down, this was taken as proof that
the culprits had been caught and the five employees were discharged.
The union agreed that "just cause" had been shown and refused to
process a grievance on behalf of the discharged employees.
Although the frequence of unfairness in grievance handling is
impossible to measure, there is no doubt that the danger to the indi-
vidual can be substantial. Within union groups cliques are not un-
common, political rivalries are often sharp and factional fights are
bitter. Refusal to process grievances or "botching" them is a subtle
but effective weapon. Seniority grievances are vulnerable to group
pressures, and "horse-trading" of grievances can become commonplace.
That these are real dangers is evidenced by the few studies made"'o
and confirmed by leading commentators.140
Beyond these dangers of malice, majority intolerance, or official
insensitivity, there are less tangible, but more pervasive values. One
of the functions of collective bargaining is to replace vagrant dis-
cretion with governing rules. The individual, by his ability to insist
that those general rules be observed, gains an assurance of fair and
equal treatment and a sense of dignity and individual worth. If the
union, by ad hoc settlement, can set aside the rule and bar the
aggrieved individual from access to any neutral tribunal, these values
are denied. What is involved, and what collective bargaining seeks
to bring to industrial life, are elemental notions of due process-the
right of a person to be governed by the law of the land and the right
to be heard in his own cause.
Although union and management may fear that transplanting
such notions of due process into our system of industrial government
will complicate their collective relationship, experience under the
Railway Labor Act suggests that those fears may prove unfounded.
139. See ABA Report on Individual Grievances 33, 41-44, 50 Nw. U.L. Rev. at 153-56.
In this study questionnaires were sent to over 1,000 labor lawyers. Out of 175 replies,
two-thirds stated that in their experience they found that meritorious grievances were
at times ignored or surrendered because of political pressures within the union. See also
Fleming, Some Problems of Due Process and Fair Procedure in Labor Arbitration, 13
Stan. L. Rev. 235 (1961); Schubert, Individual Rights in the Grievance Procedure of
the Railway Labor Act (1961) (unpublished study in Yale Law Library); Comment,
Railroad Labor Disputes and the National Railroad Adjustment Board, 18 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 303 (1951).
140. Cox, Individual Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 8 Lab. L.J.
850, 854 (1957); Dunau, Employee Participation in the Grievance Aspect of Collective
Bargaining, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 731, 759 (1950); Sherman, The Individual and His
Grievance-Whose Grievance Is It?, 11 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 35, 49 (1949).
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The collective parties greeted the Elgin, Joliet 4 decision with alarums
that it would "shackle" the unions," "cause a breakdown of griev-
ance handfing"' 143 and jeopardize the whole process of orderly adjust-
ment of disputes.144 However, no such consequences followed. The
right of the individual to carry his case to the Adjustment Board is
now accepted and the rules of notice, hearing and fair tribunal have
proved livable.
The interests of the collective parties and the interests of the
individual employees do not stand in simple opposition to each other;
they cannot be lumped for weighing on the scale of judgment to
determine whether individuals should or should not have rights under
collective agreements. The interests do not clash directly, and the
choice is not whether the union should have complete control or the
individual full independence. We are not required to choose between
polar alternatives; we are rather required to work out an accommo-
dation of the multiple needs of collective bargaining as conceived by
our national labor laws. The significant inquiry is what structure of
legal rules can be designed which will best serve all of the multiple
needs of collective bargaining, and to what extent can the varied
interests be mediated by details in the design. This is the task of the
next section.
IV
THE STRUCTURE OF SUBSTANTIVE LAW
From these varied sources which project the national labor
policy, the courts must build a body of federal substantive law de-
fining the relative rights of individual employees and unions under the
collective agreement. The state courts are as much bound by this
responsibility as the federal courts, and their task is made more diffi-
cult by the clutter of precedents which have largely ignored controlling
federal concerns. The incomplete words of section 9 (a), the suggestive
experiences under the Railway Labor Act, and the diverse needs of
collective bargaining provide no ready-made blueprint. From these,
141. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 US. 711 (1945), affd on rehearing, 327 US.
661 (1946).
142. Brief for the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and the Switchmen's Union
as Amid Curiae, Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 327 U.S. 661 (1946), quoted, 327 U.S. at
672 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
143. Brief for the Brotherhoods of Locomotive Eng'rs and of Railroad Trainmen
as Amid Curiae, Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 327 U.S. 661 (1946), quoted, 327 U.S. at
670 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
144. Brief for the Railway Labor Executives Ass'n and the AFL as Amid Curiae,
Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 327 US. 661 (1946), quoted, 327 US. at 671 (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting).
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however, emerge three guiding rules which provide a basic framework
for the law.
First, the individual employee is bound by the substantive terms
of the collective agreement. He cannot bargain individually to vary
the contract or set it aside; he can only demand compliance with its
terms. He cannot deny the union's power to make a binding agree-
ment; he can only insist that when the agreement is made, he shall
not be denied its benefits. The very essence of the individual's claim
is that the terms and conditions of his employment are governed by
the collective agreement and that neither he, nor the union, nor the
employer can refuse to live by it.
The collective agreement by which the individual and the col-
lective parties are governed is not limited to the four corners of the
written instrument. It is the whole agreement, including industrial
customs, established practices, understandings and precedents which
infuse the contractual words with life and meaning. The collective
agreement inevitably includes incomplete terms and unresolved am-
biguities; and the individual's rights, like those of the collective
parties, are subject to these gaps and uncertainties. The individual
whose claim is disputed cannot insist on his interpretation; he can
only insist on access to an appropriate procedure through which
that dispute can be resolved. In this sense, the individual's right under
a collective agreement is essentially procedural-the right of access to
a tribunal, court or arbitrator, to have his substantive claims deter-
mined and enforced.
Second, the union has a substantial interest in the settlement of
all individual claims arising under the collective agreement. The
employee and the employer cannot make a binding settlement without
the consent of the union, nor can they submit their dispute to a
tribunal without making the union a party. The union has a right
to be heard on behalf of other employees and its institutional interests.
But this right of the union has more than procedural significance,
particularly when the individual's claim arises out of a gap or am-
biguity in the collective agreement. If the union supports manage-
ment's interpretation, this will be highly persuasive to the court or
arbitrator so long as the interpretation is within the range of reason-
ableness as determined by the words, practices and precedents of the
parties. Thus the collective parties will retain a dominant voice in
completing the terms of the agreement, thereby satisfying in sub-
stantial measure this need of collective bargaining.
Third, the collective parties can change the general rules govern-
ing the terms and conditions of employment, either by negotiating a
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new agreement or by formally amending the old. The individual has
no right to have the contract remain unchanged; his right is only to
have it followed until it is changed by proper procedures. Although
contract making (or amending) and contract administration are not
neatly severable, they are procedurally distinct processes. Most union
constitutions prescribe the method of contract ratification, and it
is distinct from grievance settlement; the power to make and amend
contracts is not placed in the same hands as the power to adjust
grievances. 145 Indeed, many union constitutions expressly bar any
officer from ratifying any action which constitutes a breach of any
contract.146 Through the ability to change the agreement, the col-
lective parties retain a measure of flexibility. They are not free, how-
ever, to set aside general rules for particular cases, nor are they free
by informal processes to replace one general rule with a contrary one.
These three basic guides go far toward defining in broad terms
the relative status of the individual and the union, fulfilling the
essential purposes of the federal statutes and accommodating some of
the most pressing needs of the collective parties in managing their
collective relationship. Within this framework it is necessary to
sketch some of the details of the design of the federal substantive
law, for it is in those details that the national labor policy is
expressed and the multiple needs of collective bargaining finally ac-
commodated. In marking out the rights of the individual, it is helpful
to examine separately his rights:147 (1) when the union supports
his claim; (2) when the union refuses to support or actively opposes
his claim; and (3) when the union carries a case to arbitration that
directly affects his interests. All have common considerations, but
each raises distinctive problems.
145. Many union constitutions require that all collective agreements be approved
by the international union, some create special committees or conferences to negotiate
and approve agreements and a substantial number require ratification by membership
votes. National Industrial Conference Bd., Handbook of Union Government Structure
and Procedures 49-54 (1955). In contrast, grievance settlements, particularly at the
lower steps, are commonly made by the local officers or shop stewards.
146. For example, the Constitution of the United Auto Workers provides: "No
officer, member, representative or agent of the International Union or of any Local
Union . ..shall have the power or authority to counsel, cause, initiate, or participate
in or ratify any action which constitutes a breach of any contract entered into by a
Local Union or by the International Union ... ." Art. 19, § 1. For a similar provision
in the Constitution of the United Steelworkers see Guzzo v. Steelworkers, 47 L.R.R.M.
2379, 2381 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1960), cert. denied sub nom. Smith v. Superior CL, 365 U.S.
802 (1961).
147. Here, as in the rest of the discussion, the individual may in fact be representa-
tive of a group of employees, or the group may seek to assert their common rights.
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1. The Rights of the Individual When the Union Supports His Claim
An employee may seek to present and process his own grievance
even though the union is ready and willing to press it on his behalf.
He may distrust the union and fear that it will make but a half-
hearted presentation; he may actively dislike unions and wish to
avoid involvement or obligation; or he may favor a rival union and
prefer that it shall obtain the credit. The evidence available indi-
cates that the third reason is the main motivation in the great majority
of cases in which an individual seeks to by-pass a ready and willing
majority union.148 The proviso of section 9(a) clearly precludes an
individual from processing his grievance through a minority union,
but he can have a "more experienced friend" speak for him, and this
is often an officer or attorney for the rival union.149
Such grievances inevitably undermine the prestige of the statutory
representative and can sow seeds of disruptive tension. Moreover,
a poor presentation and unfavorable settlement may create a damaging
precedent. The union must then bear the burden of appealing and
is saddled with the handicaps of overcoming an adverse decision. Such
grievances also present problems for management, for dealing with
an individual invites distrust by the union, and settlement may
ultimately require consultation with the union.'"
The intersecting needs and desires of the parties would seem to
be best accommodated by requiring the employee to file his grievance
through the statutory representative and have it processed through
the regular channels. By giving the individual a right to be present
and an opportunity to add what he believed necessary, he would be
assured that his claim had been forcefully argued. Whether the
proviso in section 9(a) requires that the individual be given greater
rights is unclear, for neither the words nor the legislative history
distinguish sharply between the proviso's two functions-limiting the
employer's duty to bargain, and limiting the union's control over the
individual employee. The legislative history makes it reasonably clear
that an employer can legally bargain for the freedom to deal with
individuals on grievances and restrict the union's role to protesting
the adjustment. However, there is no compelling evidence that the
148. See ABA Report on Individual Grievances 33, 34-36, 49-53, 69, 50 Nw. U.L. Rev.
at 145-47, 163-67, 185.
149. Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69, 73 (5th Cir. 1945); Dunau, Employee
Participation in the Grievance Aspect of Collective Bargaining, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 731,
751-58 (1950) ; Sherman, supra note 140, at 55.
150. If the union is not consulted, it might file a grievance claiming that the em-
ployer's settlement with the individual was contrary to the terms of the collective agree-
ment and carry it to arbitration.
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right of the individual as against the collective parties was intended
to be more than the right to participate and the right not to be bound
by the settlement without consent.' The pattern under the Railway
Labor Act has been that the individual may be limited to these
rights at the lower steps of the grievance procedure, but before the
National Railroad Adjustment Board, he has free choice of repre-
sentatives.5
2
2. The Rights of the Individual Wihen the Union Refuses to Press or
Actively Opposes His Claim
The union may refuse to process an employee's grievance because
it disbelieves his version of the facts, disagrees with his interpretation
of the agreement, believes the grievance is too trivial, or because of
personal hostility or political pressures. In cases such as those in-
volving seniority, the union may actively oppose the individual's
claim or even press a grievance on behalf of competing claims. All
of the cases, however, have the common element that the union accepts
a result which the individual believes violates his rights under the
collective agreement and he seeks to enforce those rights himself.
1 3
The effort to enforce presents a cluster of subordinate problems which
must be resolved in the light of the statutory policies and the needs
of collective bargaining.
(a) What procedures must the individual follow in enforcing his
claim? The successive steps of the grievance procedure provide an
established and orderly process for consideration and review of
disputes arising under the collective agreement. It is designed to
aid in resolving those disputes, and ends with appeal to the highest
level of authority. All grievances, regardless of who is the grievant,
should be channeled through this process, for it simplifies the admin-
istrative work of management; provides the maximum opportunity
151. See Dunau, Employee Participation in the Grievance Aspect of Collective
Bargaining, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 731, 740-51 (1950). Compare ABA Report on Individual
Grievances 33, 58-62, So Nw. U.L. Rev. at 173-77; Sherman, supra note 140, at 4S-54.
152. See note 117 supra and accompanying text.
153. The individual can enforce only those provisions of the contract which are
for his personal benefit, not those solely for the benefit of the union as an institution.
The dividing line may be difficult to define precisely; but the problem is more theo-
retical than real, for the reported cases suggest that borderline provisions are not the
ones which give rise to real cases.
Distinctions between past or "accrued" rights and future rights are not meaningful
in this context, for a grievance settlement on accrued rights also articulates standards
applicable for the future, and any adjudication of the grievance must also look both
ways. See Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601, 625 (1956).
The distinction might be relevant if the parties sought to amend the contract and, for
example, canceled certain back pay claims.
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for settlement; and helps insure that the substantive terms of the
settlements will be uniform. If the union processes the grievance
through some of the steps and then withdraws, the individual should
be required to appeal through the succeeding steps.'" If the collective
parties bar his grievance, then further appeals should be excused, for
an individual's rights cannot be conditioned on his exhaustion of
nonexistent remedies.105
The grievance procedure in such a case may become three-
cornered in nature, for the union continues to be a party. In some
cases, such as discipline, the union may be neutral, torn between
hoping for the individual's hopeless cause and fearing the embarrass-
ment of his possible victory. In others, such as seniority, the union
may be more opposed to the individual's claim than the management.
No binding settlement is possible without the agreement of all three
parties.' 50
Conceivably there may be more than two competing claims-three
or more employees may seek the same promotion, or three groups of
employees may each claim top seniority. Such cases are in fact less
common than often imagined; only one reported case appears to have
involved such a dispute.'5 7 When such a case does arise, it would
seem that all claims should be represented in the grievance procedure,
whether by the union, management or other spokesmen, so that any
settlement would be final and binding on all.
(b) What tribunal should determine the individual's unsettled
grievance? The union and the employer are entitled to have a uniform
body of rules govern their relationship, and the very core of the indi-
vidual's claim is his right to equal treatment. But such uniformity and
equality cannot be achieved if individual grievances are adjudicated
154. The courts have generally required exhaustion of the grievance procedure.
See Blumrosen, Legal Protection for Critical Job Interests: Union Management Au-
thority Versus Employee Autonomy, 13 Rutgers L. Rev. 631, 642-51 (1959); Hanslowe,
Individual Rights in Collective Labor Relations, 45 Cornell L.Q. 25, 36 (1959); Summers,
Individual Rights in Collective Agreements: A Preliminary Analysis, 9 Buffalo L. Rev.
239, 250 (1959). There is no plausible reason why exhaustion should be excused in dis-
charge cases where the individual sues only for damages. See discussion note 39 supra.
155. ABA Report on Individual Grievances 33, 47, 50 Nw. U.L. Rev. at 160; Blum-
rosen, supra note 154, at 645-46; Lenhoff, The Effect of Labor Arbitration Clauses Upon
the Individual, 9 Arb. J. (n.s.) 3, 16-17 (1954); Comment, Exhaustion of Remcdies Under
Collective Bargaining Agreements: A Reappraisal, 54 Nw. U.L. Rev. 605 (1959).
156. This is the procedure contemplated by Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69,
73 (5th Cir. 1945), and implicit in the Railway Labor Act cases cited notes 118-24
supra and accompanying text. It also follows the interpretation of § 9(a) favored by
Professor Cox shortly after the 1947 amendments. Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 274, 301-03 (1948).
157. Matter of Arbitration between Iroquois Beverage Corp. and International
Brewery Workers, 14 Misc. 2d 290, 159 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
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by courts and union grievances are decided by arbitrators. 158 As the
Supreme Court has said:
The labor arbitrator performs functions which are not normal to
the courts; the considerations which help him fashion judgments may
indeed be foreign to the competence of courts.
The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the same experience and
competence to bear upon the determination of a grievance, because he
cannot be similarly informed.:'"
This mirrors the view of the parties that the deciding of disputes by
an arbitrator is a part of the very substance of the agreement. More
than that, it expresses the larger federal policy, as enunciated by
the Supreme Court, that disputes under collective agreements should
be resolved through arbitration and that courts ought not substitute
their judgment for that of arbitrators. All of these considerations
point unmistakably to arbitration as the proper forum for individual
grievances. 60
These considerations have been largely ignored by the courts in
applying state law. Arbitration rests solely on contract, they reason,
and the arbitration clause is worded as giving only the union and the
employer the right to demand arbitration. The individual employee,
therefore, has no right to arbitration.161 Often, as in Parker v.
Borock,'" this logic is but a prelude to denying him any rights under
158. One of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's grounds for dissenting in Elgin, Joliet was
that to allow the individual to sue would "permit juries and courts to make varying
findings and give varying constructions to an agreement inevitably couched in words or
phrases reflecting the habits, usage and understanding of the railroad industry." 325 US.
at 759. This danger is particularly great if the case is submitted to a jury. See Food
Fair Stores, Inc. v. Raynor, 220 Md. 501, 154 A.2d 814 (1959). But an arbitrator and
the NLRB can also arrive at opposite results on the same facts. See Ford Motor Co, 131
N.L.R.B. No. 174 (June 6, 1961) (Board expressly disclaims reaching "opposite result'
at 3). Furthermore, judicial remedies may not be the same as the arbitration remedies,
particularly in seniority and discharge cases, for the courts have refused to order rein-
statement but awarded damages as a kind of liquidation value of his seniority rights.
See ABA Report on Individual Grievances 33, 47, 50 Nw. U.L. Rev. at 159; Howlett,
Contract Rights of the Individual Employee as Against the Employer, 8 Lab. L.J. 316,
326-29 (1957).
159. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960).
160. See ABA Report on Individual Grievances 33, 63-68, 50 Nw. U.L. Rev, at 179-84;
Dunau, Comment on the Adversely Affected Employee and the Grievance and the
Arbitration Process, in Symposium on Labor Relations Law (Slovenko ed. 1961); Gray,
The Individual Worker and the Right to Arbitrate, 12 Lab. L.J. 816 (1961).
161. See Arsenault v. General Elec. Co., 147 Conn. 130, 157 A.2d 918, cert. denied,
364 U.S. 815 (1960); Matter of Arbitration between Calka and Tobin Packing Co, 9
App. Div. 2d 820, 192 N.Y.S.2d 886 (3d Dep't 1959) (mem.); Aiello v. Local 4408,
United Steelworkers, 82 R.I. 60, 105 A.2d 806 (1954); 58 Mich. L. Rev. 796 (1960);
46 Va. L. Rev. 802 (1960). See also Lenhoff, supra note 155, recommending legislation
to give the individual access to arbitration.
162. 5 N.Y.2d 156, 156 N.E.2d 297, 182 N.YS.2d 577 (1959).
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the collective agreement-essentially what the collective parties in-
tended when they denied him access to arbitration."0 3 Whether they
intended that if he had rights under the collective agreement his
claims should be adjudicated by a court rather than an arbitrator
seems much more doubtful. The more serious weakness in the logic,
however, is that it severs labor arbitration from its special context
and cramps it into common contract molds. If the collective parties
cannot by agreement prevent an individual employee from acquiring
substantive rights under collective agreement, they ought not be able
to bar him from the procedure which they have chosen to help give
the agreement life and meaning, nor should he be free to choose
another forum. This again is the pattern of the Railway Labor Act-
the Adjustment Board has primary and exclusive jurisdiction over
disputes arising under the collective agreement, whether brought by
unions or individuals.164
(c) How shall the arbitrator for individual claims be chosen?
If arbitration is the proper forum, it might be argued that individual
claims should come before the same arbitrator as union grievances.
But this would mean that the individual would face an arbitrator
named by his opponents. The more appropriate solution is an ar-
bitrator acceptable to all three parties. If the collective agreement
contemplates ad hoc arbitration, such tri-partite selection of the ar-
bitrator would not affect the substance of the agreement. If the col-
lective agreement contemplates a permanent umpire, his personal
experience, attitudes and judgment may be more of the substance
of the bargain. However, the individual employee, aware that the ar-
bitrator's tenure depends on the collective parties, may have less
than full confidence in his fairness, even though he may in fact be
more independent than an ad hoc arbitrator. The umpire himself
may find his judgment disturbed by doubts as to his own objectivity.
A substitute for the particular case may, therefore, be necessary, and
though the specially selected arbitrator is not the same person, he
will bring to the case much the same attitudes, considerations and
competence.""
Experience under the union shop amendment to the Railway
Labor Act is instructive. Shortly after the passage of the amendment,
a presidential emergency board recognized that appeal to the Adjust-
163. See Hanslowe, supra note 154, at 35.
164. See text accompanying note 114 supra.
165. The special arbitrator would normally follow relevant precedents of the umpire.
However, the umpire would not feel equally bound to follow the special arbitrator's
decision. The use of outside arbitrators for special cases in an umpire system is no novel
device. See, e.g., Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers, 171 F. Supp. 782 (D. Md. 1959).
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ment Board was not adequate protection to an employee discharged
under a union shop clause. It recommended that the individual
should have the right to request arbitration and should have an equal
right with the union and carrier in selecting the arbitrator.c A
number of unions and carriers have included provisions for such ar-
bitration in their union shop agreements; 1 7 several arbitrations have
been held under these provisions, some resulting in reinstatement of
improperly discharged employees." 6
(d) Who shall bear the costs of arbitration of individual claims?
Obviously, the union cannot be saddled with the costs of presenting
worthless grievances brought by mistaken or litigious employees.
Therefore, if the claim is rejected the individual who insisted on an
adjudication of his grievance against the wishes and judgment of
the union should bear what would normally be the union's share of
the cost of arbitration. Placing this financial burden on the individual
will serve to discourage, in the very way on which the law normally
relies, the pursuit of fanciful claims.
If the individual's claim proves meritorious, the individual has
performed the union's function in enforcing the agreement and might
logically call on the union to share the costs of arbitration. However,
the union's duty to represent does not require enforcing every jot
and tittle of the contract. If an employee is sent home for alleged
loitering in the washroom, the grievance may be worth only a few
dollars, establish no precedent and involve no principle. The union
might reasonably refuse to spend twenty times the value of the claim
to get an arbitrator's award declaring management mistaken. Or
a union might decide because of limited funds not to press certain
categories of grievances where the collective interest is not sufficient,
and leave these grievances to individual enforcement. In such cases
the individual, even though he wins, should bear the costs, for he is
entitled to no more than equal protection. However, if the union
refuses to prosecute only because of doubts as to the outcome in
arbitration, it cannot deny responsibility for the costs after the indi-
vidual, at his own risk, has dispelled those doubts by winning.
The employer continues to be responsible for his share of the
166. Railroads v. Nonoperating Unions, 17 Lab. Arb. 833, 864 (David Cole, Chair-
man 1952).
167. See, eg., Agreement Between Certain Eastern Railroads and Seventeen Co-
operating Labor Organizations § 5 (Aug. 29, 1952).
168. Matter of Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees and Pennsylvania
RR. and Fifteen Employees of the Pennsylvania R.R. (David Stowe, Arbitrator, Jan. 29,
1958), cited in Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements: A Preliminary
Analysis, 9 Buffalo L. Rev. 239, 253 n.38.
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arbitration costs regardless of whether the union or an individual is
the prosecuting party. Though there may be fears that the employer
will be harassed and burdened by litigious employees, the danger is
easily exaggerated, for the financial burden on the individual in pres-
sing the claim is relatively much greater, and there will be few who
will challenge the combined forces of union and management. 109
(e) What standard shall the arbitrator use in determining an
individual claim? The obvious answer is the same standard as used
in other grievances. This, however, oversimplifies matters. Normally
an arbitrator is concerned with accommodating the competing claims
of union and management, but individual claims often find the col-
lective parties agreed. This poses psychological, if not occupational,
hazards for the arbitrator. He must avoid being unduly influenced by
the position of the collective parties and recognize the interests of
the individual. 70
To the extent that the grievance involves questions of fact, the
arbitrator's task is simply to weigh the evidence as objectively as
possible. Questions of interpretation, however, can be more compli-
cated. The arbitrator must, of course, look beyond the written
instrument to the practices, implicit understandings, and industrial
context which make up the total agreement as he must in deciding any
other grievance. But -this may give no firm answer, for the total
agreement may still be ambiguous or incomplete. In such a case
there is reason for giving weight to the collective parties concurrence
in how the grievance should be settled. The arbitrator's inquiry
is whether the collective parties' result fits within the structure of
rules and principles of the total agreement. Does that result express
adoption of a general rule, or is it an improvisation for the particular
case? Does it add a new rule to fill a gap, or does it supplant an old
rule for a different one? These questions, to be sure, may not always
have easy or certain answers, but they suggest guides for accommo-
dating the coexistent interest of the individual in being governed
by established general rules and the interest of the collective parties
in completing their agreement."'
169. Fears that opening arbitrations to individuals will make management reluctant
to enter into arbitration agreements seem unfounded, for such a course would not free
the employee from liability but instead make him subject to suit in court.
170. Many feel that this is expecting too much of mere humans seeking the benefits
of the affluent society, and the author is not untroubled by doubts that the method of
selecting arbitrators is conducive to objectivity in protecting individual rights. However,
there are hopeful signs that arbitrators are developing a sense of responsibility for the
individual. See Fleming, supra note 139; Wirtz, Due Process of Arbitration, 11 National
Academy of Arbitrators Ann. Meeting Proceedings 1 (1958).
171. This does not assume there is any "right" interpretation, nor does It obstruct
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3. The Right of the Individual To Intervene in Arbitration
The practical objections commonly raised to allowing an indi-
vidual to demand arbitration of his grievance have little or no appli-
cation when the individual seeks to intervene in arbitration initiated
by the union or the employer. The collective parties' freedom to agree
is not circumscribed, for the arbitration manifests their inability to
agree. They are not drawn unwillingly into the procedure nor saddled
with a wholly uninvited burden. At most, the costs may be increased
a fraction by the addition of an intervenor. Selection of the arbi-
trator poses little problem, for the intervening individual will normally
be bound by the collective parties' choice. Even if the policy consid-
erations favored allowing the union to settle the employee's grievances
against his will, it does not follow that the individual should be ex-
cluded from the arbitration of his unsettled grievance.1 72 He has
important interests at stake-whether or not they are denominated
rights-and a substantial claim to being heard.
Court decisions denying the right of the individual to intervene
have most often used the sterile and unresponsive contract analysis
that the arbitration clause did not make the individual a party to the
arbitration, drawing no distinction between the right to compel and
the right to intervene.173 In Bailer v. Local 470, Teamsters,T 4 the
court also saw practical difficulties in intervention. In September,
1957, Bailer seconded a motion that the local oppose the election of
Hoffa as president of the international. The local president refused to
put the motion to a vote and declared that the local's vote would be
for Hoffa. Bailer and others then circulated a petition to the joint
council asking it to order the local president to conduct the union's
affairs in a democratic manner. The day that Hoffa was elected,
Bailer was discharged on the grounds that he had been circulating
the petition during working hours. The local submitted the case to
arbitration, but denied Bailer's request to have his own counsel
represent him at the arbitration. When the arbitrator upheld the
discharge, Bailer claimed that the adverse decision was the result of
the union's failure to represent him in good faith before the arbitrator.
Said the court:
Were each aggrieved employee permitted to be represented at an arbi-
tration by private counsel who has the right to question witnesses and
the day-to-day co-operation of the parties in working out their problems within the
guideposts of the agreement.
172. See Aaron, Some Aspects of the Union's Duty of Fair Representation, 22
Ohio St. LJ. 39, 49-52 (1961); Note, 66 Yale L.J. 946 (1957).
173. See Matter of Soto, 7 N.Y2d 397, 165 NXE.2d 85S, 198 N.YS.2d 282 (1960);
Note, 35 St. John's L. Rev. 85 (1960).
174. 400 Pa. 188, 161 A.2d 343 (1960).
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otherwise participate fully in the proceedings, the Local, as a trustee
representative, would be effectively unable to perform its duty. Union
officials and private counsel might well be at complete loggerheads over
what witnesses to present, in what order to present them, the efficacy
of cross-examination of a particular witness, or over any one of the
myriad decisions that enter into the conduct of a trial proceeding.17
Such reasons lose persuasiveness when confronted with the
realities of modern procedural rules allowing liberal intervention and
joinder of parties.1 76 In unfair labor practice proceedings before the
National Labor Relations Board, employers or unions who file charges
are allowed to participate fully along with the Board's counsel in
prosecuting the complaint. 77 It is a strange lack of confidence in
the adaptability of informal arbitration procedure to argue that it
cannot cope with such problems when the way has been shown by the
courts and administrative agencies. 78
Intervention may be sought in three types of cases. Bailer v.
Local 470 represents the first type of case. The individual may fear
that the union in presenting his claim will not make out the best
possible case-either out of incompetence, indifference or malice.
Where those fears are well-founded, allowing the individual separate
counsel is imperative if the arbitrator is to make a sound decision.
If those fears are not well founded, to deny the individual counsel of
his choice and force upon him counsel he distrusts, deprives him of
the feeling that he has had a fair hearing. The minor problems of
having an additional advocate is not a large price to pay for confi-
dence in the process. For practical reasons, the right to intervene
ought not depend on proof that the fears are well founded, for inquiry
into that issue will create added problems, impose more burdens,
and be more disruptive than to allow the individual separate counsel
in those few cases when his fears are great enough to lead him to bear
the costs.
Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., 79 represents the second type of
case-the individual (or group) interest is actively opposed by the
union and supported by the employer. Grievances rooted in seniority
175. Id. at 193, 161 A.2d at 347.
176. See generally 3 Moore, Federal Practice 2701-25 (2d ed. 1948) ; 4 Id. 1-64.
177. See Silverberg, How to Take a Case Before the National Labor Relations
Board 172 (1949). On intervention and consolidation in administrative agencies generally,
see 1 Davis, Administrative Law 564-78 (1958).
178. Arbitrators, in their pragmatic ambivalence, insist that arbitration is carried
on between the collective parties, and the individual has no right to intervene, but
Professor Fleming's study suggests that in most cases they in fact "work something
out" to enable the individual to be heard. The arbitration process has proven to havo
more than adequate flexibility. Fleming, supra note 139, at 240-42.
179. 8 Wis. 2d 264, 99 N.W.2d 132 (1959), rehearing denied, 8 Wis. 2d 277, 100
N.W.2d 317 (1960).
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rights are commonly of this character. When the issue is the right of
supervisors to seniority upon return to the production unit, manage-
ment has strong interests and may be a vigorous spokesman; but
when the issue is simply the order of layoff, transfers, or even pro-
motion, management's interest may reach little beyond saving face
and back pay. Employees in an organized plant ought not be com-
pelled to look to the employer as their defender, and they might under-
standably have less than full confidence in the employer as counsel.
Again, practical problems of proof and the burden of a second pro-
ceeding weigh against inquiring into the question whether the employer
will adequately represent the employee's interest. Much simpler and
much more productive of fairness and the sense of fairness is to
allow the individual or group to intervene and be heard on their
own behalf.
Iroquois Beverage'8 0represents the third type of case. The em-
ployer gave work to group A, the union insisted it should go to
group B, and at arbitration group C sought to intervene, claiming it
had seniority over both other groups. Obviously, without inter-
vention the interests of this group will not be represented, and the
arbitrator may not be fully informed of the ramifications of his
decision. Theoretically, the arbitration could become multi-sided
and the proceedings cumbersome, but this will in fact rarely occur,
for the dispute will almost always narrow down to the two or three
most plausible interpretations. The arbitration will probably never
become as complicated as proceedings which courts commonly confront
in litigation arising out of decedents' estates, trusts, partnerships or cor-
porate ownership.
The right to intervene need be extended only to those directly
affected by the outcome of the case. Those who are indirectly affected
by the decision as a precedent have no greater claim to being a party
to an arbitration than to any other legal proceeding. Repercussions
may reach remote employees, but that does not make their interest
sufficient to require intervention. Indeed, it is the primary concern
of the union to urge these more widespread and remote consequences
before the arbitrator. The need is only that those immediately and
tangibly affected by the specific case be allowed full opportunity to
be heard.'8 ' Though the line may be hard to define, it is less difficult
to draw in practice' s
180. Matter of Arbitration between Iroquois Beverage Corp. and International
Brewery Workers, 14 Misc. 2d 290, 159 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Sup. CL 1953).
181. See Dunau, Comment on McRee, The Adversely Affected Employee and the
Grievance and the Arbitration Process, in Symposium on Labor Relations Law at 449
(Slovenko ed. 1961).
182. Recognizing the right of groups to intervene does not require allowing each
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Closely related to the right to intervene is the right to notice of
the hearing. Since the function of the notice is to give an opportunity
to intervene, it need not be formal .1 3 If only a single employee is
involved, as in a discharge case, he could be notified by mail or any
other direct communication. The requirement of notice in such cases
adds no burden, for the individual normally has actual knowledge
and is commonly present at the hearing. Where large numbers are
involved, as in seniority cases, posting of notice in an appropriate
place or any other way designed to adequately call it to their attention
should be sufficient. It is not necessary that every member of the
group have actual knowledge of the proceedings, for if most of the
group knows, there is in fact ample opportunity to intervene.
The rights of the individual, whether to process his grievance on his
own behalf, appeal a grievance settled by the union, or intervene in
an arbitration initiated by the collective parties, may be waived by
his authorization of the union to act for him, or by his consent to its
action.8 4 Unions have sought to secure such authorization in two
ways. First, the union may include in the grievance form signed
by the individual a provision granting the union full authority to
negotiate and settle the grievance without further notice or consent.
It would seem that the union could refuse to process the grievance
unless it was given such authority; but it could not at the same time
insist that all grievances be processed by the union, for this would
make the individual's claim wholly subject to the union's control.
Such authority is of little value where groups are involved, for it
can bind only those signing the grievance and not other members
of the group; and if the grievance involves competing claims, it cannot
bind those whose interests the union opposes.
The second method used by unions to secure authorization is
to include in their constitutions clauses stating that the union is
the exclusive agent to represent all members in the presentation and
settlement of all grievances. These provisions have limited reach,
for they apply only to members of the union. If the union has a union
shop agreement, all employees may be required to become members,
but since authorization assumes voluntariness the constitutional clause
member of the group to intervene separately. Their common interests may be adequately
presented by a common representative, following principles developed by courts In
handling various types of class actions. See Lenhoff, supra note 155, at 22-23.
183. See Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 327 U.S. 661, 666 n.9 (1946); Hunter v.
Atchison, T. & SF. Ry., 171 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1948); Estes v, Union Terminal Co., 89
F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1937).
184. What would constitute authorization or consent was indicated in the first
Elgin, Joliet decision, 325 U.S. 711, 744-48 (1945), and was spelled out in greater detail
on rehearing, 327 U.S. 661 (1946). See note 107 supra.
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would seem thereby to be rendered unenforceable. Otherwise, the
employer and union, by their collective agreement, would be able to
make the union the exclusive representative for settling grievances,
contrary to the proviso of section 9(a). The fact that membership is
compelled should invalidate the blanket authorization.183 More-
over, to enforce the constitutional provision against an unwilling
employee would seem to constitute unlawful discrimination under
Radio Officers Union v. NLRB.lsO If a member openly repudiated
the clause, the only recourse of the union would be to expel him."'
The individual may consent to the union's action, either expressly
or by acquiescence. The fact that he knows that the union is proc-
essing a grievance, however, would not ordinarily indicate assent
to an unfavorable settlement made without warning. Once the settle-
ment is made and known, then failure to object would show consent.
Notice that the union was demanding arbitration would show willing-
ness to be represented by the union in arbitration unless a request
were made to intervene.
The limited reach of authorization and consent means that
settlements made by the collective parties alone in a grievance meeting
may not always be final. However, an employee who is directly affected
can upset the settlement only by showing that it was in conflict with
the collective agreement. The number of cases in which the employee
will challenge the settlement made by the collective parties will be
185. This result probably would not flow from an "agency -hop" clause which does
not require membership but only payment of a "bargaining fee." Under the Railway
Labor Act, an employee may comply with a union shop contract by maintaining his
membership in another union national in scope. Railway Labor Act § 2 Eleventh (c),
added by 64 Stat. 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. § 152 Eleventh (c) (1958). He is not there-
fore always compelled to join the majority union as under the NLRA, and a competing
union then has exclusive authority.
186. 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
187. Constitutional authorization clauses are possibly vulnerable on two other
grounds. Some constitutions also have clauses declaring that no ofilcer or member shal
have the authority to "ratify any action which constitutes a breach of any contract."
UAW Const. art. 19, § 1. See note 142 supra. When an individual appeals from the
union's settlement his claim is that the settlement is contrary to the contract and there-
fore beyond the power of the grievance committee. See UAW Public Review Board Case
No. 59 (Dec. 29, 1961). He may be able to use this clause, which was intended to
protect the union from liability under § 301, to claim that the settlement was beyond
the authority granted by him. It has also been suggested that such authorization clauses
are invalidated by Section 101(a)(4) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act, 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (Supp. II, 1959-1960). The
effect of such a constitutional provision is to bar the member from bringing an action
to enforce his rights under the collective agreement, and thereby limit his rights to
sue as protected by the Bill of Rights. See Powell, The Bill of Rights-Its Impact Upon
Employers, 48 Geo. LJ. 270, 272 (1959). See also Allen v. Armored Car Chauffeurs,
185 F. Supp. 492, 495 (D.NJ. 1960); Food Fair Stores v. Raynor, 220 Did. 501, 503
n.1, 154 A.2d 814, 815 n.1 (1959).
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very small. Through devices such as specific authorizations, notice
of proposed settlements, or ratification, the unusual cases can be
worked out without substantially disrupting the grievance process.
The structure of substantive law sketched here is both tentative
and incomplete, for it seeks only to suggest the more obvious ways of
resolving the more pressing problems. Many other details must be
filled in to complete the design, and further reflection or experience
might suggest other patterns of legal rules within the structure. 88
The most important point here is that a framework of basic rules
can be constructed which will express the statutory policies and reflect
the needs both of the collective parties and of individual workers. As
the details are filled in these needs can be further accommodated.
As the structure takes shape it becomes increasingly evident that even
with modest judicial inventiveness most of the needs can be met.
Many of the problems which at first loom large shrink to manageable
size or disappear when placed in the context of the total structure
of rules. To be sure, these legal rules will require some changes by the
collective parties in their habits of thinking and in their practices of
administering agreements, for the rules proceed from the premise
that collective bargaining is not merely a private device to serve their
collective needs but also has the public purpose of improving the dig-
nity and worth of the individual. There is no reason to fear that the
Institution of collective bargaining is so fragile or that the grievance
procedure is so brittle as not to be able to adjust to a recognition of
individual rights.
188. An alternative method of protecting the individual which has been strongly
urged is implementation of the duty of fair representation. See Cox, Rights Under a
Labor Agreement, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601, 632-34 (1956); Hanslowe, supra note 158, at
46-48. Although this theory has found favor with many courts, experience has shown
that it gives almost no protection to the individual. As in the New York cases, cited
notes 13-24 supra and accompanying text, it is almost without exception a form of words
which holds the promise to the ear and breaks it to the heart. Even its advocates
doubt its efficacy. As presently articulated, it has two critical defects: (1) the standards
applied cannot reach the subtle forms of discrimination, insensitivity and other covert
abuses in grievance handling; (2) the suit is directed toward the union when the em-
ployer is often the initiator of the protested action. Suing the union poses both
psychological and procedural difficulties, and the union cannot provide the most needed
remedy-reinstatement. To be sure these difficulties can be overcome. The standard
might be made more definite by using the contract terms as a plumb-line. See Sum-
mers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements: A Preliminary Analysis, 9 Buffalo L.
Rev. 239, at 244-48. The employer might also be made liable. See Cox, Individual
Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 8 Lab. L.J. 850, 859 (1957). But
such changes immediately create practically all the same problems as direct recognition
of the individual's right under the contract.
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